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ABSTRACT 
FETHULLAH GOLENfS VIEWS ON ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY 
Berrin Koyuncu 
Department of Political Science and Public Administration 
August 1997 
This thesis analyzes the compatibility of Islam and democracy in Turkey in the 
fight of Fethullah GOien's views. In Turkey, the most signifıcant obstacfe in front 
of consolidation of democracy seems to be the irreconciliable attitudes of the 
radicals- both on the part of the lslamists and on the part of the secularists. lt 
can be claimed that if those radical parts are rasped, cansensus politics and 
social harmony will be inevitable. Fethullah GOien may play a key role at this 
point through his re-interpretation of Islam in the light of lstamic and communal 
traditions specific to Anatofia. 
lll 
ÖZET 
FETHULLAH GÜLEN'iN iSLAM VE DEMOKRASi ÜZERiNE 
DÜŞÜNCELERi 
Berrin Koyuncu 
Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi 
Ağustos 1997 
Bu tez, Türkiye'de islam ve demokrasinin bağdaşabilirliğini Fethulfah Gülen'in 
görüşleri ışığında açıklamaya çalişmaktadır. Türkiye'de demokrasinin 
yerleşmesi sürecindeki en önemli engel hem Islamcıların hem de laikterin 
arasında bulunan radikallerin uzlaşmaz tutumlarıdır. Eğer her iki tarafta da 
görülen radikal tutumlar törpülenirse, uzlaşma siyaseti ve sosyal uyum 
kaçınılmaz hate gelir. Bu noktada Islamı, Anadolu'ya özgü islami ve toplumsal 
gelenekler ışığında yeniden yorumlayan Fethullah Gülen önemli rol oynayabilir. 
IV 
ACKNOWLEDMENTS 
This thesis owes a lot to Metin Heper for his invaluable comments and criticisms 
ı am grateful to Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu and Orhan Tekelioğlu who helped me to 
develop the thesis alogside their comments. ı want to thank Murat for providing me a 
lot of sources. 1 am gratefuf to Hidayet and Alpaslan for typing some part of the text 
and supporting me whenever ı complain about difficulties of writing the thesis. My 
greatest debt of gratitude is to my parents who encourage me for this work. 
V 
To My Family 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................. iii 
ÖZET ............................................................................................................. iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................... v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................................................. vii 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER ll: ARE ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY COMPATIBLE ? ............. 5 
2.1 lssues Related to Compatibility of Islam and Democracy ....................... 8 
2.2 lslamic Reformation ............................................................................ 13 
CHAPTER JIJ: ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY ............................ 24 
CHAPTER IV: ISSUES RELATED TO FETHULLAH GÜLEN'S 
VIEWS ON ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY .............................................. 41 
4.1 Tolerance Versus Fanaticism ............................................................... 43 
4.2 Being A Muslim In Turkey ................................................................... .44 
4.3 Turkish Nationalism ............................................................................. 49 
4.4 Educational Mobilization ...................................................................... 50 
4.5 Democracy ......................................................................................... 54 
CHAPTER V: FETHULLAH GÜLEN VERSUS NECMETTiN 
ERBAKANJS PP ....................................................................................... 60 
V11 
5.1 Political Islam versus Culturallslam ...................................................... 62 
5.2 Central Asia versus Middle East. ........................................................... 75 
5.3 Customs Union ( Integration to European Union) ............................... 76 
5.4 Fethullah Hoca Group, PP, Nationalism ................................................. 79 
CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 85 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................... 95 
Vlll 
FETHULLAH GÜLEN'S VIEWS ON ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY 
CHAPTERI 
INTRODUCTION 
With the end of Cold War, the disintegration of the USSR, and the 
dedining appeal of left-wing ideas in the past few years, the hopes for the 
further expansion of representative democracy have increased. Westem 
countries have witnessed not only the collapse of a strategic counterweight to 
their influence in the world, but also the failure of a riva! model of a voluntary 
and authoritarian modernization which in the recent past has inspired many a 
third world experiment in state-building.1 A new wave of universalism has 
fılled the void: if democratization is feasible in Eastern Europe, it may also 
take root in other regions. Representative democracy which is a form of 
indirect rule by the majority of the electorate, a system in which political 
decision-making is done by a smail number of people elected by the whole 
electorate 2 has become a kind of "common good of humanity" or , at least, a 
mode of govemment widely considered as normatively superior. 
Contemporary events in the Arab-lslamic region have reinforced a 
contrary but a widespread idea according to which that part of the world has 
been too slow in adjusting to this trend. They have been sornewhat resistant 
1 Ghassan Salame (ed),Democracy Without Democracts: The Renewal of Muslim Politics 
in the Muslim World.(London: 1.8. Tauris & Co Ltd., 1994), 1. 
2 David Robertson, A Dictionary of Modem Politics. (London: Europa Publications, 1993), 
295. 
ı 
to a rapid democratization process. 3 The region stretching from "T ehran to 
Marrakhesh" has witnessed the uninterrupted rule of authoritorian leaders. At 
this point, the special situation of the Arab lslamic Middle Eastem countries 
must be reconsidered. Why do these countries resist to democratization 
process ? Some observers think this region as an exception and attribute this 
exceptionalism to Islam. As Jean Leca reminds us 4, the presumed Arab 
"exceptionalism" is generally linked to Islam, but the connection is not unique: 
it may be, as Geliner notes, that the Arab world is exceptional canceming 
democracy because of histarical factors 5 that are unique but not necessarily 
instigated by the predominance of tstamic faith. 
Observing the resistance of the Middle Eastern countries to 
democratization, there has been a tendeney in the West to presuma that 
Islam is antithetical to democracy. The belief in "progress" and "secularism", 
twin pillars of Enlightenment, has often led to the unquestioned assumption 
that Islam and democracy "the political system of modern choice" 6 are 
incompatibte. Bemard Lewis raised this question by asking whether liberal 
3 Ghassan Salame (ed),Democracy Without Democracts: The Renewal of Muslim Politics 
in the Muslim Wortd.(London: 1.8. Tauris & Co Ltd., 1994), 1. 
4 ibid., 1. 
5 Ernest Geliner attributed lack of political representation inArab countries to traditional 
weakness of the cities. "Ciassical um ma" lives under a divine law whose protector is the 
"umma" itself. The ruler is neither the source nor the guarantee of law. He is the only 
executive power. So the state becomes a superstructure with which population does not 
identify itself (Satame, 1994:62). Ends-oriented state, the burden of military, state-
dependent middle class are other sucn factors. 
6 John Esposito and James Piscatori," Democratization and Islam", Middle East Journal, 
45:3 (1991), 428. 
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democracy can work in a society inspired by beliefs, and principles shared by 
lslamic experience and tradition. 7 In this thesis, 1 will try to address the same 
difficult question of whether Islam and democracy can be reconciled by 
studying the views of FethuJiah Gülen 8 on Islam and democracy. The 
dramatic importance of the question under discussion is that, Islam, one of 
the major world religions, may be going through a turning point in its history, 
"one that will bring it face-to-face with the challenges of the human condition 
at the end of the twentieth century ". 9 
From the baginning of the 1990s, Fethullah Gülen has been a visible 
figure in the social and political life of Turkey. ı think what makes Fethullah 
Gülen poputar is that he is presumed to come up with ideas that can be 
considered as an alternative to the views propagated by the Prosperity Party 
(PP). Representing cultural Islam which gives priority to individuat faith over 
political factors, F ethullah Gülen challenges the political Islam of the PP .10 
Here what is meant by cultural Islam is a social mavement which conceives 
Islam as a culture that is based on traditions, beliefs of a community. 
Fethullah Hoca reinterprets Islam by using the traditions and beliefs that are 
7 Bemard Lewis, "Islam and Liberal Democracy ",Atlantic Monthly, 271 
(Feb 1993), 88. 
8 The teader of a group known as "Fethullahcıs", a branch of Nurcu mavement that is 
based upon Said-i Nursi's Risales. 
9 Abdou Filal-i Ansary, "The Challenge of Secularization", Journal of Democracy, 7:2 (Apr 
1996), 76. 
10 Nilüfer Göle, " Authoritarian Secularism and Jslamist Politics: The Case of Turkey", in 
Civil Society in the Middle East. A.Richard Norton (ed), (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996), 27. 
3 
the characteristics of Turkish nation. lt caffs for a cultural renewal and thus it 
distances itself from any political mavement or ideology. The difference 
between cultural Islam and political Islam is that whereas the former aims at 
having autonomy from the state, the fatter seeks for state power. Because 
cultural Islam does not aim at grasping power, it becomes functional in the 
construction of civil society. 11 Anather important reason that inspired this 
study is Fethuffah Gülen's radical re·interpretation of Islam. This opens up 
antirely new possibility of the reconciliation of Islam and democracy in 
Turkey. 
In short, this thesis shaff compare Fethullah Gülen's views with the PP's 
views on Islam and democracy and it wiff focus on whether Gülen's views on 
Islam and democracy render them more compatible. The plan of the thesis 
will be as foffows: the first chapter is the introductory chapter in which the 
subject of the thesis and its significance is mentioned. In the second chapter, 
the issues related to the compatibility of Islam and democracy is presented. In 
the third chapter, the rafationship between Islam and democracy in Turkey is 
examined. The fourth chapter studies Fethuffah Gülen's views on Islam and 
democracy. In the fifth chapter, the differences between Fethullah Gülen's 
and the PP's perspectives to the issue of Islam and democracy are 
discussed. In the light of Fethullah Gülen's views, the sixth, concluding 
chapter looks at the prospects for reconciliation of Islam and democracy in 
Turkey. 
11 Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, Postmodernite. Sivil Toplum. islam. (istanbul: iletişim Yayınları, 
1994), 187. 
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CHAPTER ll 
ARE ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY COMPATIBLE? 
As Bemard Lewis states, in the discussion of major issues, it is fatally 
easy to go astray by misuse or misinterpretation of some of the words that 
one uses. 12 That is why ı should fırst clarify what is meant by the terms 
"liberal democracy" and "Islam". 
Liberal democracy has two aspects. First aspect is associated with 
representation. Here, the usual system is the election by the whole electorate 
of a smail number of representatives, in most cases organized in political 
parties forming a legislative assembly. The majority of this assembly ma kes 
the law, and many, in parliamentary systems like those of United Kingdom 
and Canada, select some among themselves to form the executive. lt is thus 
arather indirect form of a majority rule. 
·Other aspect refers to a set of traditional values drawn from the basic 
stock of civil rights and natural rights which may be enshrined in a 
constitution and protected by the courts. 13 Liberal democracy is associated 
with limited government (limited by the constitution), free elections, protection 
of individual rights and political representation. 
Islam denotes a religion -- a system of belief, worship, doctrine and 
ideals --that belongs to the family of monotheistic, scriptural religions that 
12 Bemard Lewis, " A Histarical Overview ", Journal of Democracy, 7:2 (Apr 1996), 52. 
13 Robertson, 282. 
5 
includes Judaism and Christianity. In other words, Islam refers to the whole 
human civilization that has developed under the aegis of that religion: 
something I ike what is meant by the one-comman term "Christendom". 14 In 
Islam, Sharia came tomean the divinely mandated path, the straight path of 
Islam, that Muslims were to follow, that is God's will or law. But because the 
Quran does not provide an exhaustive body of laws, the desire to discover 
and delineata lslamic law in a comprehensive and consistent fashion Ied to 
the development of an lslamic jurisprudence (fiqh). Fiqh is an Arabic word 
whose basic meaning is understanding/interpretation. By extension it 
denotes science or discipline that has sought to ascertain, interpret, and 
apply God's will or guidance (Sharia) as found in the Quran to all aspects of 
life. As a result of ai-Shaffii's efforts, classical lslamic jurisprudence (fiqh) 
recognized four primary sources, as well as other subsidiary, sources.15 
The leading primary source of Islam is the Quran which is the 
sourcebook of lslamic principles and values. White the Quran contains Iegal 
prescriptions, the bulk of it consists of broad, generat moral directives on 
what Muslims ought to do. The Quranic principles and values were 
concretized and interpreted by the second and complementary source of law, 
the Sunna of the prophet, the normative behavior of Muhammed.16 Third 
classical source of Islam is independent reasoning ijtihad (to strive or 
14 Lewis, " Histarical " , 53. 
~ 
15 John Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path. (New York:Oxford University Press, 1988), 79. 
16 ibid., 80. 
6 
struggle intellectually). When faced with new situations or problems scholars 
have sought a similar situation in the Quran and the Sunna. The key is the 
discovery of the effective cause or reason behind a Sharia rule. If a similar 
reason cauld be identifıed in a new situation or case, then the Sharia 
judgement was extended to resolve the case. Fourth source of lslamic law is 
the authority for cansensus (ijma) which is usually derived from the saying of 
the Prophet, "My community will never agree on an error". Cansensus served 
as a brake on the vast array of individual interpretations, as legal scholars 
contributed to the creation of a relatively fıxed body of laws. 17 
The reason why the classical sources of Islam were mentioned is to 
differentiate the use of Islam in this cantext from the neo-lslam of the so-
called "fundamentalists" who introduce ideas known neither to the Quran nor 
to the Sunna and classical doctrines of faith. 18 Muslim fundamentalists think 
that the cammunity of Islam has been led into error by foreign infıdels and 
Muslim apostates. lt is widely claimed that Muslim apostates abandoned the 
laws and principles of faith, and adopted secular ("heathen") laws and values. 
All the foreign ideologies such as liberalism or socialism are considered evil 
because they, supposedly, set Muslim against Muslim. The Muslim world is 
now suffering the inevitable consequences of forsaking the God-given law 
anda way of life that were vouchsafed to it. Asa remedy, they propose the 
old Muslim obligation of ''jihad': to wage holy war at home, against the 
17 ibid., 84. 
18 Lewis, "Historical ", 54. 
7 
pseudo-Muslim apostates and then re-lslamize society to resume the greater 
role of Islam in the world. 19 lt is obvious that for lslamic fundamentalists, 
liberal democracy is an irrelevance. But it is a dilamma that they are willing to 
demand and exploit the opportunities that a "self-proclaimed" democratic 
system is bound to offer. 20 Thus, it is signifıcant to emphasize that we are not 
really concerned about the compatibility of democracy and lslamic 
fundamentalism. What should be questioned, here, is the compatibility of 
democracy and Islam itself. 21 
2. 1 Jssues Related to Compatibility of Islam and Democracy 
One may ask now whether Islam as a religion or as a civilization 
antithetical to liberal democracy. According to Bemard Lewis, from a histarical 
perspective, Islam offers the best-prospects for liberal democracy.22 The 
most signifıcant element in the lslamic tradition regarding democracy is the 
classical lslamic concept of supreme sovereignty which should be elective 
and contractuat.23 The central institution of sovereignty in the traditional 
19 Lewis, "Islam", 91. 
20 ibid., 91. 
21 ibid., 91. 
22 ibid.' 88. 
23 Lewis, "Islam", 91. 
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lslamic world, the caliphate, is defıned by the Sunni jurists to have contractual 
and consensual features that distinguish caliphs from despots. The exercise 
of political power is conceived and presented asa contract, creating bonds of 
mutual obligation between the ruler and the ruled. Subjects are duty-bound to 
obey the ruler and carry out his orders, but the ruler has alsa duties toward 
subjects, similar to those set forth in most cultures. The contract can be 
dissolved if the ruler fails to fulfıll or ceases to be capable of fulfılling his 
obligations. 
The lslamic principle of consultation, according to which a ruler should 
not make arbitrary decisions by himself but act only after consulting with 
suitably qualifıed advisors, was brought to the agenda as a sign of democracy 
in lslam.24 In fact, some scholars argue that Islam is inherently demecratic 
not only because of the principle of consultation, but also because of the 
practices of "ijtihad' (independent reasoning) and ijma (consensus). lt is 
argued that just as lslamic law is rescued from the charge of inflexibility by 
the right of jurists in certain circumstances to employ independent judgement; 
similarly, lslamic political thought is rescued from the charge of autocracy by 
the need of rulers to consult widely, and to govem on the basis of consensus. 
Muhammed Asad, an influential modernist Muslim thinkar put the matter 
forcefully: "The legislative assembly ... majlis ash-shura must be truly 
representative of the entire community, both men and women ... the members 
24 ibid., 98. 
9 
of the "majlis" must be elected by means of widest possible suffrage, 
inc!uding both women and men "_ 25 
Acceptance of pluralism in lslamic law and practice is also important for 
the debate on compatibility of Islam and democracy. One of the sayings 
traditionally ascribed to the Prophet is this remark, "Difference of opinion 
- . 
within my community isa sign of God's mercy ".In other words, diversity is to 
be welcomed, rather than suppressed.26 From the beginning, the ls!amic 
world has been inclusive. Extending over three continents, it embraced a 
wide variety of races, creeds and cuftures which lived side by side in 
harmony. Despite seetarian strife and religious persecution, unity and 
diversity of perspectives was always there. 
The acceptance of four different schools of thought by Sunni Muslims 
exemplifıes the pluralist attitude in Islam. Acceptance of diversity and mutual 
tolerance to differences of opinion show that it is possible to be orthodox 
white differing. 
lt is also claimed that there are no essential contradictions between 
Islam and human rights doctrines. The most primary right of a human-being is 
the right to live and own private property. These two rights were ansured by 
the Prophet Muhammed in his address to the people on the occasion of his 
farewell pilgrimage: "Your blood and your property are sacrosanct until you 
meet your Lord, ... know that every Muslim is Muslim's brother, and that the 
25 Esposito and Piscatüri, "Dernocratization", 434-5. 
26 Lewis," Histarical ", 56. 
10 
Muslims are brethen. lt is only lawful to take from a brother what he gives 
willingly". 27 
Another basic human right is the freedom of conscience. The Quran 
fully guarantees this right in the folllowing verse: "There is no compulsion in 
the religion " (Sura 2, Verse 256). The Muslims must not ony respect others' 
freedom of conscience, but they are even expected to be generous to those 
non-Muslims who do not fıght against them in the cause of religion. The 
Quran says, "Allah forbiddeth you not respecting those who warred not 
against you on account of religion and drove you not out of your homes that 
you should show them kindness and deal justly with them. Allah loves the just 
dealers" (Sura 60, Verse 8).28 
The Prophet himself set a noble example of religious toleration when he 
signed a treaty with the Christians of Najran. The following are the terms of 
this treaty as narrated by lbn Qayyim: "From Muhammed, the Prophet to Abu 
Harth and the bishops of Najran and their priests and monks and those who 
live in their churches and their slaves; all of them will be under protection of 
God and his Prophet ; no bishop will be removed from his bishopric, no monk 
will be removed from his monastery ... there will be no change in the rights 
enjoyed by the m so far''. 29 
27 Brahi, 1993, 246-7. 
28 ibid., 248. 
29 ibid. 1 249. 
ll 
30 "b"d ı ı . 
Anather human right is the right of equality. The Quran adumbrated its 
own ideal of human equality in the following verse: "A mankind! We have 
created you male and female and have made you into nations and tribes so 
that you may know one another. The noblest of you in the sight of Allah is he 
who is best in conduct " (Sure 49, Verse 13). 30 Thus, the only superiority 
enjoyed by a human being over other human being is due to his righteous 
behavior. The same principle was repeated by the Prophet in his address to 
the Muslims on the occasion of his farewell pilgrimage when he said: "People, 
your God is one, your father is one. No Arab has superiority over a non-Arab 
as nonon-Arab has superiority over an Arab ... except by piety". 31 Thus, it is 
the oneness of man's origin or nature which enhances equality in lslamic 
teaching. As far as economic equality is concerned, Islam instituted the 
system of cananical yearly alms or poor-tax to ensure that no individual falls 
below a certain minimum of matarial well-being. The ineome of this tax was 
distributed locally to the poor and the needy sections of the region. The 
lslamic principles of private and public conduct were designed to achieve true 
ideals such as justice, freedom and equality. All these were mentionedin the 
Quran and illustrated in the practice of the Prophet. 
31 ibid., 250. 
12 
2. 2 lslamic Reformation 
In the sixteenth and seventeeth centuries, European trade missions 
progressively expanded so that by the eighteenth century many areas of the 
~-
Muslim world felt the impact of the economic and military challenge of 
Westem technology and modemization. Because Muslim world was declining, 
a major shift in power-- from Muslim world to the West--occured from that of 
ascendant expansionism to one of the defensiveness and subordination.32 
From the baginning of the nineteenth century, all Muslims, including the 
Ottomans, have been aware of their decline. According to Bemard Lewis, the 
disastrous failure of the second siege of Vienna (1683) and the Treaty of 
Karlowitz ( 1699) were the signifıcant signs of decline in the Ottoman 
Empire.33 The elite perceived the cause of the decline in military terms and 
tried to make retorms in the military. Same reformers argued that European 
military superiority derived from economic and political rather than military 
causes. Others identifıed the sources of Westem power as industrialization 
and constitutional government. In the twentieth century, the Arab failures in 
the struggle against lsrael, from 1948 onwards, revived the great debate on 
what was wrong with Muslim world like. First, Arabs perceived their failure in 
military terms. But soan they realized that bigger armies and better weapons 
did not bring solutions. They, then, began to look for more radical solutions 
toprevent "corruption in lslamic society". Bemard Lewis has classifıed those 
32 Esposito, Straight, 128. 
33 Lewis, "Islam", 90. .. 
13 
34 'b'd ı ı . 
35 'b'd ı ı . 
who feel that the present systems are corrupted and new institutions must be 
installed into two groups: the lslamic fundamentalists and the democrats. 34 
1 have already discussed fundamentalists at the previous paragraphs. 
"Democrats", ·on the other hand, fıght for reform in the lslamic lands and 
claim to represent a more effective, more authentic democracy than restricted 
or distorted by some intrusive adjective. lt is a democracy not nutlifıed by a 
priori religious or ideological imperatives, and not misappropriated by regional 
or seetarian interests. In part their movement is an extension to the Middle 
East of the wave of democratic change that has already transformed the 
governments of many countries in Southarn Europe and Latin America, in 
part it is a response to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the new 
affırmation of demecratic superiority through victory in the Cold War. 35 
Alongside fundamentalists and democrats, there are also reform-
minded Muslims who challenged the blind and unquestioned clinging to the 
past. They think this caused the internal decline of the Muslim societies, their 
loss of power, their backwardness and their inability to respond effectively to 
European colonialism. These reformers stressed the dynamism, flexibility 
and adaptability that have characterized the early development of Islam. They 
pressed for internal reform through a process of reinterpretation (ijtihad) and 
selactive adoptation (lslamization) of Western ideas and technology. These 
14 
ideas were developed in the works of several key fıgures in the nineteenth 
century. 1 now look at some of them. 
Jamal Al-Din Al Afghani ( 1838-1897) was an outstanding fıgure of nineteenth 
century Islam and a major catalyst for lslamic reforms. He attempts to bridge 
the gap between secular modernists and religious traditionalists. He argues 
that Muslims could repel the West not by ignoring or rejecting the sources of 
Western strength (science and technology), but instead by reclaiming and 
reappropriating reason, science and technology. He was an ardent advocate 
of constitutionalism and parliamentary government to limit the power of the 
rulers. Central to Afghani's program for lslamic reform was his call for a 
reopening of the door of ijtihad. He tried to formuiate new lslamic respanses 
to the changing conditions of Muslim societies. 36 
Muhammed Abduh ( 1849-1905) argues that the transformatian of Muslim 
society depended on a reinterpretation of Islam and its implementation 
through rational educational and social reforms. He maintaines that while 
those aspects of lslamic law that governed worship (such as prayer, fasting, 
pilgrimage) were immutable, those aspects that were concerned with social 
affairs (such as penal, commercial and family laws) were open to change 
when the conditions required it. Abduh argues that the core of lslamic 
36 Esposito, Straight, 130-1. 
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principles and values should be reapplied to new realities and, where 
necessary, the old layers of tradition should be discarded.37 
Muhammed lqbal (1875-1938), an lndian lslamic modernist, develops his own 
synthesis and interpretation of Islam in response to the socio-historical 
conditions and events of his time. lqbal takas positive aspects of Western 
culture such as dynamic spirit, intellectual tradition, technology. lqbal is 
equally critica! of the excesses of the West, such as imperialism and 
colonialism, and moral bankruptey of secularism. He turns back to the past to 
rediseover those principles and values that could be employed for 
reconstructing an alternative lslamic model for the modern Muslim society. 
His attempts result in the discovery of lslamic versions of democracy and 
parfiamentary government. lqbal points to the precedents in lslamic belief 
which, through reinterpretation, could be used to devetop lslamic equivalents 
to Western concepts and institutions. lqbal stresses the fact that because of 
the centrality of such beliefs as the equality and brotherhood of befievers, 
democracy is the most important political ideal in Islam. 38 
Savyid Ahmed Khan (1817-1898), an lndian lslamic modernist, argues that 
the survival of Muslim community demands a bold reinterpretation of Islam 
and the acceptance, and not rejection, of the best in Western thought. He 
37 ibid., 131. 
38 ibid., 142. 
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the centrality of such beliefs as the equality and brotherhood of believers, 
democracy is the most important political ideal in Islam. 38 
Sayyid Ahmed Khan (1817-1898), an lndian lslamic modernist, argues that 
the survival of Muslim community demands a bold reinterpretation of Islam 
and the acceptance, and not rejection, of the best in Western thought. He 
37 ibid., 131. 
38 ibid., 142. 
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indicates that the survival of Islam depends on avoiding unquestioned 
acceptance of medieval interpretations of Islam. Survival of Islam also asks 
for the exercise of ijtihad to produce fresh interpretations of Islam to 
dernonstrata its ralevance and validity for modem life. He believes Islam is 
the religion of nature and reason. The word of God and the work of God 
(nature) are not necessarily in contradiction. 39 
For the modern times, two Middle Eastarn philosophers are significant 
for the lslamic Reformation. One is Abdul Karim Soroush, a Shi'ite Muslim 
from Iran. The other is Sheikh Rachid a/-Ghannouchi, a Sunni Muslim from 
Tunisia. These philosophers produced some of the most far-reaching work 
on the question of Islam and democracy over the past three years. 40 
Abdul Karim Soroush was educated in London and Tehran in both 
philosophy and the physical sciences. Soroush has recently taught at Tahran 
University' s school of Theology.41 
His advocacy of democracy for the lslamic world rests on two pillars. 
First, to be a true believer one must be free, because belief under threat or 
coercion is not true belief. Freedam is the basis of democracy. For Soroush, 
an lslamic democracy cannot be imposed from above; it is only legitimate if it 
is supported by the majority, including both believers and non-believers. 
39 ibid., 138. 
40 Robin Wright," Two Visions of Reformation ",Journal of Democracy, 7:2 (Apr 1996), 67. 
41 "b"d ı ı . 
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Second, argues Soroush, our understanding of religion is evolving. He 
claims that the revealed text is immutable but it can be reinterpreted. lt has 
been revealed to the heart of the Prophet, and so it should be kept intact and 
none has the right to change the text. But the interpretation of the text is 
open to change. No interpretation is possible without presuppositions. 
Presuppositions are prone to change since the knowledge of mankind is in 
flux. Thus, no interpretation is absolute or fıxed for all times and for all places, 
but the sacred text should not, stili, be changed. In fact, this is how Soroush 
expresses the situation: "The text is silent. We have to hear the its voice. In 
order to hear, we need presuppositions. In order to have presuppositions, we 
need the knowledge of the age. In order to have the knowledge of the age, 
we have to surrender to change. So we have here the miraculous entity that 
is changing but at the same time is immutable". 42 
The next broad subject that Soroush addressesis related to the clergy. 
He argues that in the ideal lslamic democracy, the clergy have no a priori 
right to rule. The state shoufd be run by whoever is popularly elected on the 
basis of equal rights under law. He thinks that the clergy should be freed so 
that they are not "captives" forced to propagate offıcial or popular views, 
other than the faith of Quran. Clerics should work like everyone else, making 
independent ineome through scholarship, teaching or other jobs. 
Finally, Soroush deals with the subject of secularism. According to 
Soroush, secularism means developing a critica! and scientific approach to 
42 ibid., 69. 
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life --which has nothing to do with hostility to religion. Soroush argues that 
the ancient world was based on a single source of information: religion. The 
modern world has more than one source: reason, experience, science. 
Modemism was a successful attempt to free mankind from the dietatarship of 
religion. Postmodernism is a revolt against modernism --and against the 
dietatarship of reason. In the age of postmodemism, reason becomes 
humbler and refigion becomes more acceptabfe. For Soroush, the 
rec-.ondliation between the two has bec.ome potentially more visible.43 By 
pointing the way to innovative interpretations of the Quran and the Sharia, 
Soroush provides a foundation for a pluralist and tolerant society. 
Rachid AI-Ghannouchi is a popular philosophy teacher and speaker who 
finished his education in Damascus and Paris. Ghannouchi founded the 
Mouvement de la Tendance lslamique (MTI) in 1981 during a brief interlude 
of Tunisian politicalliberalization. But Tunisian govenment refused to legalize 
the MTI. Ghannouchi persisted in calls on the regime to share power by 
introducing political pluralism and economic equality. He was jailed in 1981. 
When he was released in 1984, the government did not let him teach, speak 
in pub!ic, or pub!ish. 44 
In 1987, Ghannouchi was again arrested and charged with plotting to 
overthrow the government. He was released after a bloodless coup in 
44 ibid., 71. 
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November 1987, which led to anather brief political thaw. The MTI, renamed 
ai-Nahda in early 1989 to remove religious overtones, was promised a place 
at the political arena. But by the time of the April 1989 legislative elections, 
the thaw was over. Ghannouchi was sentenced to life-time imprisonment 
because his party was found guilty for plotting the coup. In 1993, British 
govemment granted him political asylum.45 
Ghannouchi advocates an lslamic system that features majority rule, 
free elections, a free press, protection of minority rights, equality of all secular 
and religious parties, and full women's rights. 
According to Ghannouchi, lslamic democracy is primarily the product of 
scriptural interpretation. In one of the several interviews held between 1990 
and 1995, he claims that Islam did not propose a specific program canceming 
our life: "lt brought general principles. lt is our duty to formuiate this program 
through interaction between lslamic principles and modemity. Believers are 
guaranteed the right of ijtihad (interpretating the Quranic-text). Their 
empowerment is complete since Islam did not have institution or person as a 
sole authority to represent the faith. The process of Shura, moreover, means 
that decision-making belongs to the community as a whole". 46 He argues that 
the democratic values of political pluralism and tolerance are perfectly 
compatible with Islam. 
45 ibid.' 73. 
46 ibid., 71. 
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Next, lslamic democracy is also a product of recent human experience. 
The legitimacy of contemporary Muslim states is based on liberation from 
modern European colonialism, a liberation in which religious and secular, 
Muslims and Christians participated together. For Ghannouchi, there is no 
room to make distinctions among citizens; complete equality is the base of 
any new Muslim society. The only legitimacy is the legitimacy of elections. 
Ghannouchi said that freedam comes before Islam; it is the step leading to 
Islam. 47 
Ghannouchi calls the act of striking a balance between the holy text and 
human reality 'aqlanah' which is translated as "realism" or "logical reasoning". 
Aqlanah is dynamic and constantly evolving. Asa result, Ghannouchi, like 
Soroush, believes that Islam and democracy are an inevitable mix. 
Ghannouchi's acceptance of pluralism is not limited to the lslamic world. 
Responding to Samuel Huntington's widely discussecl essay on the "Ciash of 
Civilizations", Ghannouchi contends that cultural or religious differences do 
not justify conflict, but instead can provide ground for cooperation rooted in 
mutual recognition of complementarity. "We appeal for a dialogue between 
Islam and the West, for the world now is a smail viiiage and there is no 
reason to deny the other's existence," he claimed ina 1994 interview. 48 
Of course one should be aware of the fact that the "liberal" 
interpretations of a few lslamic reformers are not suffıcient for the 
47 ibid., 74. 
48 'b'd 1 ı . 
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reconcitiation of Islam and democracy. In fact, these reformers are challenged 
by some critics, including Muhammed Arkoun. He calls these philosophers 
as "Muslim apologists", who misread the history by reading it backwards. 
He claims that they sought to counter Europe-centeredness with lslamic-
centeredness, perpetuating the idea that there i_s a single Islam with a single, 
superior, exclusive capacity for generating truth. 49 Stili, these Jslamic 
reformers' attempts are important steps toward the reconciliaiton of Islam 
and democracy. 
Similarly, Wright 50 notes that the lslamic reformist mavement has a 
very long way to go. Although there are other philosophers who alsa think 
that Islam and democracy are compatible, lslamic reformers, stili, constitute a 
distinct minority. Their efforts to promote democracy in Muslim lands may 
experience bumps, false starts, and failures, and these may take a long time. 
Yet, the tsıamic reformation in question represents the best hope for a 
reconciliation both within Islam, and between Islam and the outside world. 
49 Mohammed Arkoun, Rethinking Islam. (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994), ix. 
50 Wright," Reformation", 75. 
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CHAPTER lll 
ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY 
As noted before, after the Gulf War, political liberalization and 
democratization came to the agenda and became an important question in 
the Middle East. The unquestioned assumption that Islam and democracy are 
incompatible has also been mentioned. In the 1990s, the increasing power 
of lslamic movements and their unexpected success in the elections of 
countries such as Egypt, Pakistan, Algeria, Jordan and Turkey forced us to 
reconsider the debate over compatibility of Islam and democracy. We have to 
again address the question of whether political Islam can be reconciled with 
democracy. Those who respond to this question affirmatively argue that 
moderate lslamic opposition should be allowed to compete in a democracy. 
This would enable the integration of the opposition into the system. And 
within the system, they would become even more moderate. Those who 
respond to this question negativefy argue that if the lslamic opposition had 
the opportunity to compete in a democracy, fırst they would play the game 
according to rules but if they capture power, they would become authoritarian. 
Those who do not believe the compatibility of Islam and democracy argue 
that "democracy is not one man, one vote, once ". 1 
The recent success of the Prosperity Party (PP) at December 1995 
general elections brought the issue of the compatibility of Islam and 
1 Sabri Sayan," islam, Laiklik ve Demokrasi (Türkiye Örneğinde Perspektifler)" in islam ve 
Demokrasi. (istanbul: TÜSES Yayınları, 1994), 135. 
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democracy to the political scene. Should they be trusted to form the 
govemment ? Could they destroy the system when they come to power ? Or, 
if given the chance to form the government, would they integrate into the 
system and function smoothly ? To answer these questions, one should 
investigate the rafationship between democracy and Islam in Turkey. Turkish 
case is crucial for the issue of the compatibility of Islam and democracy 
because as Bemard Lewis has noted "of the forty-six sovereign states that 
make up the lntemationallslamic conference, only one, the Turkish Republic, 
can be deseribed as a democracy in Western terms ... ". 2 Turkey represents 
a unique case within the Muslim context because the secularization process 
in Turkey has been a cumulative process whereas in the Middle East 
secularization process is a cyclical pattem of ebb and flow between secularist 
and lslamic trends. 3 
What makes secularization process unique in Turkey is the "state-
dominant nature of Turkish political culture ".4 The Ottoman state was an 
"lslamic state" but the influence of religion was limited. Ottoman rulers had 
sovereign powers through which they could issue laws and regulations that 
were not based on lslamic precedents (örf-i sultan-i). 5 By the nineteenth 
2 Bemard Lewis, "Islam and Liberal Democracy", Atlantic Monthly, 271 (Feb 1993), 89. 
3 Metin Heper," Islam, Polity and Society in Turkey: A Middle Eastern Perspective ", Middle 
East Journal, 35 (1981), 363. 
4 ilkay Sunar and Binnaz Toprak, " Islam in Politics: The Case of Turkey", Government and 
Opposition, 18 (1983), 421. 
5 Heper, " Islam, Polity", 347. 
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century, these bureaucratic elites adopted a basically secular and state-
oriented tradition, called "ada b". 6 Şerif Mardin argues that there was an 
inherent tension in Ottoman rule which was made up of lslamic and 
bureaucratic components. The Ottoman state was both "lslamic" and 
"bureaucratic". lt was "lslamic" inthesense that Islam was the religion of the 
state. In addition, the Sultan's primordial role was that of the caliph, the teader 
of the lslamic community. lt was "bureaucratic" because Ottoman officials 
worked for the preservation of the state. By the middle of the eighteenth 
century, the bureaucratic style became dominant.7 This perpetuated the 
autonomy of the state vis-a-vis religion. 
Before the middle of the nineteenth century, in theory, the law of the 
land in the Ottoman Empire was the Sharia, religious law based on Quran. 
With the inception of the Tanzimat (Reform) era (1839-1876), the 
bureaucratic elites introduced new administrative institutions and economic 
incentives; a new administrative law and a ratianale for administration were 
brought about. Reason was going to be the eriterian in promulgating policies. 
With these changes, the prestige and the position of ulema (Doctors of Holy 
Law) were undermined: they were given marginal rolesin administration, the 
judiciary, and the educational system.8 Thus, the secular retorms of the 
6 Metin Heper, " The .State, Religion and Pluralism: The Turkish Case in Comparative 
Perspective", British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 18 (1991), 40. 
7 Şerif Mardin, " Religion and Secularism In Turkey " in Atatürk: Founder of A Modern 
State, Ali Kazancıgit and Ergun Özbudun (eds). (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1981), 194. 
8 ibid., 196. 
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nineteenth century were possible because of the relative autonomy of the 
political sphere and its legitimation on grounds other than religion, also 
because of the construction of a strongly structured and differentiated state. 9 
Sultan Abdulhamid ll (1876-1909) demonstrated how Islam can be 
utilized as a political formula. Believing in science and its practical 
applications, Abdulhamid ll opted for the use of Islam as a lever which would 
instill some consciousness of a collective goal into his subjects. By 
establishing contacts with sheiks and dervishes (using religious orders), 
Abdulhamid ll tried to get the Arab population to develop loyalty to the 
Ottoman state. In fact, he attempted to forge an identity among rural masses 
in order to give maaning to their allegiance to caliph. According to Mardin, 
this intelligent policy is meaningful to understand Atatürk's attitude toward 
Islam. 10 
A new type of social thinking which envisions society in terms of both an 
abstract model and a blueprint for the future emergad in the 1880s. But, this 
did not operate effectively until the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. The 
Young Turks were not able to avoid from working within the mosaic structure 
of Ottoman society, various ethnic and religious groups, and with Islam as 
the thin thread keeping the population of the Ottoman Empire together. 
Because of their scientific utopian worldview, they were critica! toward the 
9 Ali Kazancıgil," Democracy in Muslim Lands: Turkey in Comparative Perspective", 
International Social Science Journal, 128 (1991), 347. 
10 Mardin," Secularism", 200-1. 
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use of Islam asa "raiser of consciousness". Ziya Gökalp, one of the Young 
Turks, tried to fınd an altemative to Islam. He focused on two ideas: nation 
and civilisation. His blueprint for the future was to draw out the latent Turkish 
culture of the Turkish nation, to establish a Turkish state based on it, to 
accept Western civilisation, and to make Islam a matter of conscience. 11 
With the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the World War 1 and the loss 
of Arab lands, part one of the lslamic formula-- to integrate Arabs into 
Ottoman identity- lost its relevance. When the Allies tried to impose the 
terms of the Treaty of Sevres which aimed to partition Turkey, Atatürk 
resorted to Islam in order to maintain national unity when he was organizing 
resistance against it. During the War of lndependence (1919-1922), the 
lslamic discourse was used to mobilize the masses-part two of the lslamic 
formula. The war was presented to the peasantry by pro-Atatürk local 
notables and religious teaders as jihad, holy war.12 
With the foundation of the Republic (1923), the source of authority was 
designated as the nation before anything else. As Islam was perceived an 
obstacle to modernization, lslam-oriented culture was substituted by a new 
secularist culture. Thus, between 1922 and 1924, Atatürk undertook an 
impressive number of retorms such as abolishing the sultanate, the caliphate 
and the office of Şeyh-ül Islam (religious authority) and Sharia courts. Next, 
11 ibid., 208. 
12 ibid.' 208. 
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the Article Two of the 1924 Constitution that designated Islam as the state 
religion was abrogated. Religious orders and the fez (head gear for men) 
• 
were outlawed between 1925 and 1930. In addition to these measures, the 
Directorata of Religious Affairs was established. This institution was saddled 
with the task of interpreting and executing an enlightened version of Islam. 
The Directorata was staffed by civil servants. The purpose behind creating 
such an institution was not to separate spiritual realm -religious- from the 
temporal realm -state, but rather through institutionalizing Islam, control 
religion. 13 
According to Paul Dumont, there are two lslams in Turkey: one is the 
"official Islam" which applied to all the structures over which the state 
exercises to various degrees its direct control; the other one is the "free-lance 
Islam" which corresponds to the world of sects, brotherhoods, associations 
and groups of all kinds that escape from the authorities' control, and appear 
all the more dangerous as they are clandestine, and deprived of a clear 
profıle and an officially defıned religious program. 14 Thus, during the 
Republican period, there was a twofold strategy toward Islam. One was 
repressive (suppressing Sufı tarikats because they were perceived as threats 
13 Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu," Paramaters and Strategies of lslam-State lnteraction in 
Republican Turkey", International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 28 (1996), 235. 
14 Paul Dumont, " Islam As A Factor of Change and Revival in Modern Turkey " in Turkic 
Culture: Continuity and Change, Sabr M. Akural (ed). (Bioomington, IN: Indiana University 
Turkish Studies, 1993), 1. 
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by the ruling elit~; the other was accommodative (utilizing lslamic symbols to 
gain popular legitimacy). 15 
With _the official Islam, the Republican elite tried to transform religion into 
a modamizing factor through a vast range of retorms so as to put Islam at 
the service of the new ideas that the Kemalist Revolution wanted to implant. 16 
Even the aim of religious instruction in the schools was to form not only good 
Muslims, but also by means of this renovated religion, good citizens, true 
patriots and zealous workers who would adapt their personal and social life to 
the evolution of the modern world (using religion for secular aims). Henry 
Fischer claimed that "Islam, in Turkey has become aslave-of-all work of the 
state", used to serve the policy of modemization, social transformation and 
economic development.17 
On the other hand, the Kemalist state tried very hard to suppress free-
lance Islam. This has also contributed to the free-lance lslam's reactionary 
nature during the Republican era; there was hostility toward the Republican 
regime and Kemalist Reforms. This hostility was reflected in the uprisings that 
took place in the 1920s and 1930s. At this point, the bureaucratic elite 
decided to pursue an even more "militant secularism". 18 
15 Sakallıoğlu," Paramaters ", 236. 
16 Dumont, " Islam As ", 2. 
17 Henry Fischer, 1932, 69. 
18 Feroz Ahmad, " Politics and Islam in Modern Turkey ", Middle Eastern Studies, XXVII 
(1991}, 8. 
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The transition to multi-party politics (1945) ended the strict policies of 
secularization of the single party-period. Some observers characterized this 
period (1950-1960) in Turkeyasa time of"lslamic resurgence" or "revival". 19 
The relaxed attitude of the Demecratic Party (DP) toward Islam played a 
signifıcant role here. But as ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu states, the so-called 
lslamic revival did not pose a challenge to the system. In fact, what the DP 
did was to introduce voluntary religious courses into primary schools, 
reestabJish the call to prayer in Arabic, increase the number of imam-Hatip 
Lycees (preacher schools). By pursuing such policies, the aim of the DP was 
not to establish an lslamic state, but to respond to the demands of the rural 
masses.20 
The "resurgence" of Islam in this period was marked by the stepped-up 
activities of religious orders and groups such as the Ticani and Nurcu, by 
increasing activity of the voluntary religiously-oriented service organizations 
and by the publication of a large religious literature. The DP had instrumental 
and pragmatic reasons for having a conciliatory attitude toward the "revival" 
of Islam. The alliance between peripheral Islam and the DP was a bargain 
m ade for mutual benefıt: eleeteral support for the DP, tolerance toward 
religious groups. 21 That is why we cannot label the period between 1950-
1960 as a period of resurgence of Islam. 
19 Sunar and Toprak," Islam in Politics", 429. 
20 Sakallıoğlu, "Parameters", 237. 
21 Sunar and Toprak," Islam in Politics", 430. 
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As Binnaz Toprak and ll kay Sunar have put it,. the im portant thing about 
this period (1950-1960) was the baginning of a new politicswhosenet impact 
was the instrumentalization of Islam by the DP for electoral purposes.22 
With the military coup on 27 May 1960, the Democrats were overthrown. 
The military regime ( 1960-1961) introduced the 1961 Constitution which 
opened up a liberalization period with the widened scope of liberties. There 
are two important aspects of this period. First, the liberal atmosphere of the 
1961 Constitution enabled the establishment of a refigiously-oriented political 
party. Second was the revival of the legacy of "Atatürk's rationalist positivist 
appraisal of the mass appeal of the state-interpreted version of Islam". 23 
Cemal Gürsel praised Islam to secure the political and moral legitimacy of the 
military regime and to check against any reactionary upsurge using Islam. 
During the War of National Liberation the state-building elite had behaved 
similarly. 
The Justice Party (JP), heir to the DP, had a secular outlook toward 
religion. As Sakallıoğlu has noted, the JP formulated and resolved the 
question of the political role of Islam as follows: fırst, the party-based 
legitimacy of the political system was set on popular sovereignty. 
Consequently, Islam disappeared from the public sphere. Because of the 
liberai-Westernist stance of the military, white not radically departed from the 
periphery-oriented traditional discourse of the DP, the JP sought a more 
22 ibid., 431. 
23 Sakallıoğlu, ll Paramaters ll, 238. 
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secular-liberal identity which would have an impact on the form and 
substance of its policy toward Islam. Thirdly, the JP used Islam against 
Communism.24 Thus, the JP pursued policies toward Islam which did not 
conflict with the goals of secularism and modemization. 
lt was in 1969 that the first explicitly religious political party was 
established in the Republican history -the National Order Party. The party 
was disbanded by the Constitutional Court a year later for violating the law on 
the organization of political parties which forbade the exploitation of religion 
for political purposes. In 1972, the party was reestablished as the National 
Salvation Party (NSP). Although the party had an lslamic discourse, its 
approach was somehow different from the discourse of the 1950s. Earlier, 
the lslamist worldview, as preached by the Nurcu and other orders, had 
encouraged political quietism by teaching that this world was a field to be 
sown for the next world.25 In the discourse of the NSP, there was a call for 
activism. 
The NSP was a neo-lslamic party whose major concern was the political 
retraditionalization of Turkish culture along lslamic precepts. By emphazising 
rapid industralization, the NSP placed this concem within a modernist 
context. In the NSP view, Turkey had a distinguished imperial past which was 
attributable to its success in combining military power with the building of an 
lslamic civilization. The "National Outlook" (Milli Görüş), the NSP's "ideology", 
24 ibid., 239-240. 
25 Ahmad, " Politics and Islam ", 12-13. 
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promised a country which would be fully industralized through economic 
cooperation with the Muslim world, the prerequisite of which was a retum to 
Islam as the basis of social organisation.26 The NSP appealed to masses 
who were badly hit by rapid economic growth, and the world economic erisis 
of the 1970s. In terms of its constituency, the puritan language of the NSP 
combined with anti-capitalist rhetoric and emphasis on populist social justice 
enabled the party to draw support from what Şerif Mardin has called "the men 
of the bazaar", particularly the smail merchants and artisans. 27 Thus, the 
voice of the party is not the reaction of the tradition but the protest of those 
who wanted a large political and economic role in the expanding world of 
modemity.28 
The NSP had also a strong tarikat (religious order)-based support, 
especially from the Nakşibendis. But the Nakşi~ndi support did not last long. 
When the NSP fonned a coalition govemment with the Republican People's 
Party in 197 4, tarikats blamed the NSP for being coopted by the political 
system and withdrew their support from the party. 
Although the NSP was not very successful in the elections (it received 
11,8 percent in 1973 and 8,6 in 1977 elections), it made contributions to the 
political participation in Turkey. Peripheral Islam. for the first time in 
26 Binnaz Toprak," The State. Politics and Religion in Turkey", in State. Democracy and 
Military: Turkey in the 1980s, Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds). (Berlin: Walter De 
Gruyter, 1988), 125. 
27 Sunar and Toprak," Islam in Politics", 436. 
28 ibid.' 438. 
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Republican history, found in the NSP an institutionalized and organized voice 
in the national life of the country and the halis of the Grand National 
Assembly. 29 The NSP fılled the void of a belief system that would compensate 
for the feeling of lass that the individuals experienced as a result of 
republican retorms and rapid urbanization. That is why, in the 1970s, there 
were same attempts by secular official circles to put emphasis on Islam. 
Since the mtlitary intervention of 1980, state policy toward Islam has 
changed. Offıcial discourse articulated and tolerated lslamic elementsin the 
public realm that had until that point been under the monopoly of secular 
standards and criteria. 30 Attitudes regarding secularism were softened. 
Religious instruction in primary and secondary schools were made mandatery 
by the 1982 Constitution. Kenan Evren, Chief of the General Staff who led the 
1980 mifitary intervention, and who was president from 1982 to 1989, justifıed 
his various exhortations to adopt "modem" ways of doing things by making 
referances to some verses in the Quran.31 The socio-political activities of the 
religious orders which had been banned in 1925, reached peak levels. The 
members of religious orders penetrated all ranks of political society. The 
Süleymancı and the Nakşibendi orders were allawed to run unoffıcial Quran 
29 ibid., 441. 
30 Sakallıaği u, " Paramaters ", 44. 
31 Heper, " The State, Religion ", 51. 
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courses and youth hostels. The publications of religious orders have 
mushroomed. 
In 1983, a new neo-lslamic party, the Prosperity Party (PP) was founded 
as the successor party to the National Salvation Party which was cJosed after 
the 1980Jmilitary intervention. Reminiscent of the "National Outlook" of the 
NSP, the PP calls its ideology "National Consciousness" (Milli Şuur). lt 
defines national development as a combination of matarial and spiritual 
welfare. By spiritual development, the PP understands a retum to indigenous 
sources of culture and interprets the modemization efforts of the last two 
hundred years as a failure. 32 What is needed is a new consciousness which 
wifl place matarial wealth under the umbreıra of higher values. The PP 
promises prosperity and wealth without the familiar pains of rapid 
industralization. The PP's appeals for social welfare, social justice and 
political freedam can be interpreted as attempts to reach civil servants and 
workers as supporters. In fact, rising Muslim bourgeoisie who find a little 
chance for social mobility, also, support the PP. The NSP was mostly made 
up of smail merchants, traders and artisan s. 33 
In the 1980s, the PP, stili, had limited eleeteral support. In the 19841ocal 
elections, the PP received 4,4 percent of the votes; in the 1987 parliamentary 
elections 7,2 percent in the 1989 local elections 9,8 percent of the votes. 
This may be partly attributed to the diversity of lslamic groups and platforms 
32 Toprak, " The State, Politics ", 128. 
33 ibid., 129. 
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expressing different interests, and priorities. While some religious orders 
have chosen to operate within the existing party spectrum {the PP was 
rumored to have connections with the followers of the Iate Nakşibendi skeikh 
Mehmet Efendi, Süleymancıs were assumed to have connections with the 
Motherland Party {MP), and the Nurcus were known to support the True Path 
Party (TPP) as they previousfy supported the JP and the DP), there is a 
radical fundamentalist movement which refuses to engage in party activity. 
This movement sees party politics as a cooptation and confınes itself to 
intellectual pursuits. 34 
The split of the previous NSP support between the PP and the MP is 
another factor of limited eleetaral support of the PP. The post-1980 civilian 
governments of the MP shared the mifitary's visian of reconstructing the 
relationship between the state and society so that religion would be 
controlled by the state. The NSP clique within the MP was headed by the 
party's vice-president Mehmet Keçecifer. Turgut Özal, himself, was known for 
his religiousness as well as affinity with the NSP. T echnical elites within the 
MP tried to develop a synthesis between lsfamic vaıues and pragmatic 
rationality through reconcifing the former cultural orientations with the 
requisites of economic growth and Westem democracy.35 Thus, the MP 
mobilized Turkey's traditionally conservative constituencies and some lslamic 
34 ibid., 130. 
35 Nilüfer Göle, " Towars An Automization of Politics and Civil Society In Turkey", in 
Conflict and Consensus in Turkish Politics: Qilemmas of Transition to Democracy, Metin 
Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds). 
37 
platformsaraund the cause of economic liberalism. And in this process, they 
integrated them with the existing order. 36 
In the 1980s, Islam became a vehicle for the youth to protest against the 
military regime, especially in a period when politics was forbidden to students . 
. 
Female students insisted on veiling (türbanl in the classroom. The retigion-
state relationship in the 1980s downgraded the diffusion or success of radical 
Islam that aimed to alter the legal and prohibitionist framework of political 
system through incorporation of Jstamic platforms and voices to the political 
system. Consequently, the recent visibility of Islam in Turkey does not pose a 
threat to the functioning of democracy. The revival of Islam in Turkey has 
traditionally not been an increase in the force of the "religiosity", but in the 
scope of religiosity which means that the range of social contexts within 
which religious considerations are regarded as having more or less direct 
ralevance increased. 37 
The previous chapters mentioned the hostility of Sufi tarikats toward the 
Republican regime. Today, it seems that the situation has drastically 
changed. Although Ticanis and Süleymancıs are known to be anti-republican 
and anti-modernist, there are other orders which display remarkable 
adaptability to the present-day conditions. The Nurcus can be given as an 
example. The Nurcu (disciples of light) mavement was led by Said-i Nursi 
36 Sakallıoğlu," Paramaters ", 247. 
37 Heper, " Islam, Polity ", 363. 
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(1873-1960), aNaksibendi sheikh of Kurdish origin. His works were printed in 
smail bookfets under the generic title of Risale-i Nur ( message of light). Said-i 
Nursi argued that law of science is one of the greatest qualities of "a good 
Muslim ". 38 
The typical Nurcu as s/he appears in the commentaries of Said-i Nursi 
is not only endowed with a positive spirit but is also a good republican, and 
evenaman retatively receptive to the principles of laicism. In his work on the 
Nurist thought, Safa Mürsel, author of a monomental work on the philosophy 
of Said-i Nursi, does not hesitate to state that Said-i Nursi opposed theocracy 
and moreover was a convinced sopporter of a Repobiican and pluralist 
democracy, which he considered as the only governmental form in conformity 
with the principles of Islam. Mürsel argoes that Said-i Norsi considered the 
ideal state as the one guided by the teachings of Muhammed; but in the 
absence of such an fstamic govemment, Said-i Norsi recommended a regime 
based on laicism, that isa total freedom of thought and religion, excfuding 
any state control of the spiritual life of the citizens. 39 In fact what said-i Nursi 
tried to do was to keep faith in private sphere. That is what Fethullah Gülen 
means when he talks about saving the individuaf identity. 
lt can be said that the Nurcus, though respectful to lslamic principles, 
constantly tend to redetine them in the light of the changes in the modem 
38 Dumont, " Islam As ", 8. 
39 ibid., 10. 
39 
40 "b"d ı 1 . 
world.40 Because of their tendeney to compromise and equilibrium in their 
ideological trends, Nurcu philosophy should be defıned as "moderate 
fundamentalism". 41 Here, what is meant by "fundamentalism" is the attempt 
to change the existing system and establish an lslamic state. 
The comments above, on the Nurcu mavement and Said-i Nursi, have 
been made to indicate two important facts. First, one can observe that Said-i 
Nursi's thoughts are parallel to those of Abdulkarim Soroush and Rachid Al-
Ghannouchi. As mentioned before, Soroush argues that the reconcmation of 
Islam and democracy is inevitable; in Muslim societies if one is absant the 
other will not exist. Also, Ghannouchi attempts to protect minority rights, 
recognizes equal rights for women, and supports free elections. 42 Fethullah 
Gülen, follower of Said-i Nursi, shares the views of Soroush, Ghannouchi 
and represents a simitar stance toward Islam and democracy. 
Secondly, generally, in today's context, people tend to view Islam as an 
element of the traditionat society system. Also, Islam is usually perceived as 
a factor that slows down change-led modernization. But what has been told 
up to now shows that Islam has actively contributed to the process of change 
which has been developing in Turkey si nce the 1920s. 43 
41 ibid.,11. 
42 Şahin Alpay," Ufuk Turu", Milliyet, 1 August 1996. 
43 Oumont," Islam As", 13. 
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CHAPTERIV 
ISSUES RELATED TO FETHULLAH GÜLEN'S VIEWS 
ON 
ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY 
Fethullah Gülen· is. in today's Turkey, the leader of one branch of 
Nurcu movement, called Fethullahcıs (though he does not like his group to be 
called "Fethullahcıs" because he does not consider himselfas sheikh). He is a 
former civil servant as prayer leader and preacher. During the 1980 military 
intervention (1980-1983 period), his name was seenin the "wanted" list of the 
military regime. Before the 1990s only those who were interested in religious 
movements knew about Fethullah Hoca and his group. In the1990s, he 
became widely known, especially because of his critica! attitude toward the 
Prosperity Party (PP). The extended web of colleges in the Central Asia, 
Fatih University and Asia Finance lnstitution were the attempts of Fethullah 
Hoca group which contributed to Fethullah Hoca's public appearance. 
After the March 27 1994 local elections, with the unexpected electoral 
success of the PP --by obtaining19,7 percent of the votes, won 29 
municipalities 1--- some people became anxious about the further increase in 
the PP's votes in the future because they conceived this success as a threat 
Popularly known as" Fethullah Hoca". Thus, in the following discussion, 1 
will call him Fethullah Hoca. 
1 Hakan Yavuz. " Refah Partisi: Modernleşmenin içinde,Batılılaşmanın 
Dışında; Sistemin içinde, Hükümetin Dışında ", Türkiye Günlüğü, 38 (Jan-Feb 
1996), 49. 
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against the system. When following the December 24 1995 general elections 
the PP came to power as a coalition partner, the PP obtained the plurality of 
the votes, 21 ,4 percent and won 158 chairs in the parliamenı2 ; that the 
"secularists"' fear reached its peak, and a secularist-fundamentalist 
polarization has emerged. That is why from the baginning of 1995, Fethullah 
Hoca became a person who was widely discussed in Turkey. He was made 
known through the interviews held by leading national newspapers (Millivet 
and Sabah). In those interviews emerged a calm, modest figure, who by 
saying "my nation" and "my state" shows to what extent he is respectful to the 
state, who is an admirer of Picasso and who does not hesitate to say that 
"Nazım is also the offspring of this country".3 By drawing such a profıle and 
presanting a "moderate" lslamic approach that is at peace with the secular 
order, which is in contrast to the politicallslam of the PP, Fethullah Hoca has 
~ 
been appreciated by the secularists who are anxious about the PP's political 
lslam-based rise in the 1990s. At this point there is an ongoing debate about 
whether Fethullah Hoca may contribute to the reconciliation of democracy and 
Islam through his moderate approach to Islam. Here it is necessary to 
investigate the issues related to Fethullah Hoca's canception of democracy 
and Islam. 
2 
'b'd ı ı . 
3 Ömer Laçiner, "Seçkinci Bir Geleneğin Temsilcisi Olarak Fethullah Hoca 
Cemaati ", Birikim. 77 (Sept 1995), 9. 
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4.1 Tolerance Versus Fanaticism 
Fethullah Hoca's conciliatory or tolerant worldview is guite signifıcaıJ1. 
·------ ·-
He sees his mission as gathering different grou~-<?.~~-mon_g~ound and 
.. _,,....~--...----...,.,__.,., 
teaching them to be respectful for the others' rights and thoughts. On 
fanaticism, Fethullah Hoca's views are as follows: "fanaticism and intolerance 
~-- ·~-~-~-~--- .. ...., .. ,~---~----··- _,., ...... ~--"-'•>-···-·~-~-~----~,.-~--- ~--
should be given up; what we should do is to accept everyone as s/he is. The 
~-. ...._ _______ "_, __ ~-~·---.. -...- ___ .,. _______ , __ ,_ ~ 
problem should be _solved through dialogue, reason, rationality and at the 
heart. We live ina world of dogmas and fanaticis~: lt is -~~ue thaU~ t~~-~~tory 
of Islam at some time and in some places, dogm~s carried the day. But this 
was found unsatisfactory and dogmas were 9iY~O..!JQ.".4 
He argues that the concepts of "secularism" and "sharia" should not be 
perceived as insults, otherwise there would be polarization among the people. 
He meets political and religious leaders and tries to establish a dialogue 
among them. One such attempt is the " Hand in Hand for the Happy Days " 
Conference held by the Journalists' and Writers' Foundation on October 1, 
1996 to which several artists, businessmen, politicians and religious leaders 
attended.5 Fethullah Gülen is the spiritualleader of the Foundation. Especially 
Fethullah Hoca's meeting with Fener Rum Patriarch Barthelomeos should be 
appreciated for being the harbinger of tolerance and civility. Because this is 
the fırst meeting of a civil community leader with a Christian religious leader 
after the proclamation of the Republic. This indicates the fact that "Official 
4 Eyüp Can, Ufuk Turu. (istanbul: AD Yayıncılık, 1996) 
5 Zaman, 2 October 1996. 
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Islam" is being transcended. Muslim-Christian, religious relations are 
canalized to their natural processes. 
4.2 Being a Muslim In Turkey 
Fethullah Hoca has developed the notion of " being a Muslim in 
Turkey", which seems to contradict the universal character of Islam. He 
contends that without harming the universal character of Islam, Turkey 
succeded in devetoping a moderate interpretation of Islam. According to 
Fethullah Hoca, one of the sources of Turkish culture is Islam, second one is 
the quality of being a Turk originating from Asia, and stili other is the 
mysticism, the divine side of Islam. Toktamış Ateş, a "Kemalisf author who 
writes in istanbul daily Cumhuriyet claimed that this notion of ''being a Muslim 
in Turkey" isa concept of Fethullah Hoca which for many years he has been 
writing on and supporting.6 Ali Yaşar Sarıbay evaluated Fethullah Hoca's 
Islam as "religious nationalism".7 According to Fethullah Hoca, Turkish Islam 
differs from the Islam practised in such Muslim countries, as Iran and Saudi 
Arabia, because in Turkey Islam has been incorporated to democracy and 
secularism. In fact, he goes further and claims that Turks did not take Islam 
from Arabs. He explained this claim in his words as follows: "Those Musfims 
living in Turkey had not taken the source of theirIslam directly from Mecca or 
Medina. This thought may disturb some peopfe. The Centraf Asia became 
6 Can, Ufuk Turu, 189. 
7 ibid., 169. 
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Muslim in the SOth anniversary of Mohammed's emigration to Medina. In the 
fırst century of Mohammed's emigration, signifıcant Muslim personalities had 
emigrated from Türkmenistan and Afghanistan to Mecca and Medina. 
ismail Hami Danişment indicated that at the time of emigration of 
signifıcant personalities, suddenly a thousand tabernacle of Turks become 
Muslim. lt is said that Ebu Hanife was a Turk. imam Buhari and imam Müslüm 
were the personalities who had hadith-books and who lived in the Asia. 
Hermeneutics, hadith, interpretation were brought from Asia. In the 4th and 
Sth anniversary of the emigration of Mohammed, they -hadith, hermeneutic 
and interpretation- were trusted to the Little and Great Seljukian and were 
inherited to the Ottoman Empire. Not directly, but the origins of lslamism went 
to the Asia and there, they were regulated, those parts open to interpretation 
were interpreted. Again, those Muslim personalities evaluated the 
interpretation basis of Islam. They made a lot of analogies. They chose the 
mystic path which can be claimed as the spiritual life of Islam. Those 
dervishes, then, came-to the Little Asia- Anatolia. There may besome parts of 
Hadith, Fiqh, lslamic constitution which are latent. But there are some other 
parts, such as istihsana (an auxiliary law source according to Hanifa jurists, 
meaning that one prefers close interpretation to open one or prefers an 
exceptional degree to a general one), istishab (maintaining the existing legal 
situation) which are open to interpretation and these were also interpreted by 
Turks. 8 
8 Sabah. 23 November 1997. 
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Whether it be Islam, Christianity or Judaism, ata period when there is 
no sea trade, there may be verses, hadiths about sea trade. But one can not 
consider a world that he does not know. One should make investigation on 
this matter and integrate it into system. 
Modern interpretation shows us the existence of several verses in the 
Quran and hadiths about the modern sciences. That is why the interpretation 
is very important. So it can be said that at different parts of the world -three-
forth of majority of lslamic world- the Hanifa understanding and Turkish 
nation's interpretation dominate. One can call it Turkish lslamism with its parts 
open to interpretation. 9 Fethullah Hoca says that Ahmet Yesevi, Mevlana, 
Yunus Emre were the representatives of this tradition. 10 
Fethullah Hoca evaluated the situation about the political and religious 
belief lived in Middle Eastern countries in the following words: "In Turkey, we 
have freedom of thought, freedom of expression. lt is not possible to fınd such 
an environment of freedom either in Southarn Iraq or in Saudi Arabia. 
Because Saudi Arabians urge people to go to mosques. lt is not acceptable to 
urge people to conduct the divine service in a mosque. You should explain 
people and persuade them to do something. Worshipping requires will or 
volition. For this reason, a person who is mentaliy-ili is not responsible to God. 
9 
"b"d ı ı . 
10 Yeniyüzyıl, 11 November 1996. 
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So ı do not approve of Islam practised in the Middle Eastarn countries". 11 
Fethullah Hoca is discontent with the lslamic image constructed by the 
fundamentalists according to which "if a person does not share your views, 
you cut off his head, and then everybody will live and think like you" .12 
Fethuflah Hoca argues that the tolerant attitude in Turkish culture and the 
mosaic structure of the empire ( diversity of the ethnic and seetarian 
backgrounds of the people in the empire) had a positive impact on the 
practice of Islam in Turkey. People in Turkey are open to change. The other 
Muslim peoples did not have any connection with the outer world, so they live 
isolated and have closed lives. This had a negative impact on their lslamism; 
they are fanatics. Fethullah Hoca told that he had many Muslim friends in 
Australia, and the Arab world who are fanatics because they struggle over the 
details of Islam which are secondary in importance. For instance, Fethullah 
Hoca takes the turban (başörtüsü) issue asa detail ('furuat'). He claims that 
"those who bring the turban issue to the agenda should respect to those who 
do not veil" .13 Fethullah Hoca had also criticized the turban movements of the 
1980s in the universities by saying that such movements were not compatible 
with Islam. 
11 Sabah. 24 January 1997. 
12 Can, Ufuk Turu, 32. 
13 Yeniyüzyıl. 11 November 1996. 
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Being heir to Said-i Nursi who attempted to reconcile the aim of secular 
schools, where education is based on positive science and aim of madrasas 
where education is based on religion, Fethullah Hoca proposes a marriage 
between secufar and religious schools which he called as •the marriage 
between the school and the madrasa". 14 This will be achieved through 
preservation of faith in private sphere. He emphasizes the need to folfow the 
methodology of positive sciences. Related to this, he disapproves the hostility 
against the West because he is aware of the fact that such hostility will make 
us remain behind the times. He tries to get rid of things which make lsfamic 
world inferior in comparison to the Christian world. This is the modemized 
form of Jamal al-Din Afghani's views. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
Afghani was a moderate graduafist reformer who prefers educational and legal 
raforms to sudden violent action. He introduced rationalist view into lslamic 
philosophy. He thinks a reopening of door of interpretation of law and doctrine 
could lead to a Protestant type of reform in Islam. This is important because 
lslamic reform is the prerequisite to the acceptance of modem science and 
technology. Fethullah Hoca states that our national feelings and thoughts 
should be in line with the requirements of the age. Of course, the essence and 
the identity of Turkish nation should be preserved, but with the globalization, 
we must come up with new policies. That is why he thinks the integration with 
the West is inevitabte. 15 
14 Can, Ufuk Turu, 75. 
15 ibid., 45-46. 
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4.3 Turkish Nationalism 
On every occasion, Fethullah Hoca emphasized his loyalty to the state 
and to the nation. Hakan Yavuz argues that the Nurcu movement, under the 
leadership of Fethullah Hoca was being nationalized and being brought under 
state control. 16 According to Yavuz, these procesess are related to "Dadaş 
saul" whose main characteristic is its acceptance of state's primacy over 
religion. Araund Erzurum and Bayburt regions, the state is thought to be the 
prerequisite for the preservation of Islam. 17 This is an Islam that one can 
come across at the boundary regions where the inhabitants are frequently 
threatened and sametimes occupied by other religious power centers; thus, an 
approach which perceives the existence of the state obligatory for the 
preservation of the nation and Islam exists among the people living in those 
regions. One can call this approach state-centric understanding of Islam. 
ömer Laçiner claims that Turkish Republic recently defined itself as a 
nation-state made up of precisely Sunnite-Turks or of the segments who are 
converted to being a Turk. The rest is conceived as minority. 18 Thus, 
according to Laçiner, the media held a campaign -through interviews- to 
prevent the rise of the PP at the center of which Fethuflah Hoca stands. 
Laçiner argues that in fact, the purpose of this campaign is to make the 
16 Şahin Alpay's interview with Hakan Yavuz in Milli'let, 3 August 1996. 
17 "b"d ı ı . 
18 Laçiner," Seçkinci", 9. 
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Turkish nationalism legitimate and formal by the state and the center-right 19 ; 
Fethullah Hoca is used against the legitimacy erisis lived in Turkey because of 
PKK (illegitimate terrorist organization) and Kurdish question in the 1990s. In 
short, it is an effort to raise Turkish nationalism as the main cancem of 
political order. 
4.4 Educational Mobilization 
The most significant activity of Fethullah Hoca and his group is 
educational mobilization. The Central Asia is selected as the pilot area for this 
purpose. In Özbekistan and Türkmenistan, a gigantic education army was 
established. In Özbekistan, there are seventeen secondary institutions with 
3,343 students and 209 teachers and one language center. In Türkmenistan, 
there is one university with 293 students and twenty-eight Turkish staff 
members; thirteen secondary education institutions with 2, 694 students and 
163 Turkish reachers, one language center with eighty students and seven 
teachers. 20 
The aim of this education campaign is not to transfer religious 
knowledge to those students in Özbekistan or in Türkmenistan; but to achieve 
a change in the morality of the students. This is what Said-i Nursi proposed in 
his Rişale-i Nur in the name of "human project", that is nurturing "persons with 
19 "b"d ı ı . 
20 Ali Bayramoğlu," Orta Asya'daki Türk Misyonerleri", Yeniyüzyıl, 31 
October 1996. 
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high morality", or good Muslims. According to Said-i Nursi, in the core of faith 
stands morality and individual, religious symbols are one part of it. This is the 
first step in the project. Second step is the marriage between faith and 
science which was mentioned before. This marriage is considered to be the 
framework that circumscribes faith, action, donation feelings because it is 
directed both to the lslamic and to the non-lslamic, to the requirements of the 
age and the great" ideal", that is to compete and to cope with the things that 
do not belong to the West and to Islam in order to protect the purity of Islam. 
Thus, the aim of the Central Asia model education is to create a powerful 
Turkey which will be able to compete with the West in terms of scientific and 
technological developments. 21 
The approach that frames this education campaign has its roots in a 
histerical lslamic model, that is tradition, materialization (dünyevileştirme), 
personal lslamic understanding, the relation between the national and the 
religious, the relation with the state. 
The education in the Central Asia is said to be a secular one. A group 
of Turkish journalists, joined a trip to Özbekistan which was arranged by 
Zaman newspaper, between 20-28 October in 1996, appreciated this gigantic 
education web, and they reported that they were pleased to see that it is a 
secular education whose curriculum is similar to colleges and "science lycees" 
in Turkey. Same, who are not convinced with this report, have stili an anxiety 
about the content of the education. Whether this education model, that is 
21 "b"d ı ı . 
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based on a project to bring up" individuals with high morals" is democratic or 
not is debatable. What is clear is that there exists a different lslamic project, a 
different society model developed by the Fethullahcıs. What are the basic 
dimensions of this model ? 
First, the project places its emphasis on the individual rather than 
society to communicate Islam. Fethullah Hoca thinks that perhaps because 
Turkish people are the grandchildren of a militarist generation, there isa little 
inciination toward improving individualism. If it is not something related to 
generic heritage, Turkish people should be incited to think freely and to gain 
his/her individual identity. He claims that Islam has an individualist approach 
to each person. What he tries to say is that when an individual reachs his/her 
maturity, s/he will learn how to live in a society automatically. For Fethullah 
Hoca, the militarist heritage of Turks is the most crucial obstacle thatstandsin 
front of improvement of democratic culture. In an interview made with him by 
Nevval Sevindi, a journalist writing for a daily, Yeniyüzyıl, Fethullah Hoca 
points to the difficulty of biossaming individualy. For him, this is the reason 
why people prefer to take shelter in communities.22 Second, it is a project 
which aims at providing the Muslim with mundane knowledge and power 
derived from this knowledge. Thus, it encourages a war of science. Thirdly, it 
isa project to complement lslamic concern with action; an investment is made 
to bring up good Muslims. A good Muslim is defıned with good presentation of 
22 Yeniyüzyıl, 28 July 1997. 
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the person who communicates. For a good presentation, there are two basic 
requirements: faith and science. Fourthly, a good and true presentation 
includes the tocat and the national as it also makes references to the 
traditional patterns of behavior. 23 There is a fact that in a conjuncture where 
religion-society theme is questioned, this leads to different conflicts; it is 
possible to find the causes of materialization which is inspired from both "örf-i" 
and "şer-i" traditions. One can observe this in the Central Asia model. 
The members of the Fethullah Hoca group have different motivations 
to work in the schools in Özbekistan and Türkmenistan. Merchants. on the 
one hand, have profit motivation, and on the other hand, they have 
motivations of donation, faith and gazza. Educators' work for the sake of 
bringing up individuals with "high morals". They have also career motivation. 
This is what is called "sameness in difference" (aynılık içinde gayrılık).24 In 
other words, in this scheme while the core becomes materialized, there are 
also autonomous but legitimate interrelated aspects. This model is the 
inevitable consequence of the attempt to adopt Islam to the contemporary 
age. The project is inspired by both tradition and interpretation and, thus, it 
protects the transcendental characteristics of the religion. 
23 Ali Bayramoğlu," Said-i Nursi'nin Geri Dönüşü", Yeniyüzyıl, 1 November 
1996. 
24 'b'd ı ı . 
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4.5 Democracy 
Fethulfah Hoca's interpretation of Islam creates a fertile ground for 
democratization efforts in Turkey. In one of interviews made with him, he said 
that: "there will be no retum from the road of democracy neither in Turkey nor 
in the world .... democracy is a reality of humanity, an outcome of histarical 
process ".25 Fethullah Hoca argues that it is not right to think that democracy 
is opposite of Islam and Islam is the opposite of democracy. For him, 
democracy is a system to which all the world has an inclination. However, it is 
not a perfect system as it is stili being improved upon. Democracy is a 
process of arriving at maturity.26 Fethullah Hoca has never voted in elections 
but he advised the citizens who came to the mosque to vote because it is a 
citizenship duty. Also through political participation, public should be taught 
democracy. 
On 3 July, 1995 Fethullah Hoca who spoke in "Ateş Hattı" (TV 
programme in TRT 1) said that "Atatürk was a military and administrative 
gen i us". Thus he highlighted his respect for the founder of Republic who was 
called as impostor by some RP members who had hostile attitudes toward 
him. 
25 Can, Ufuk Turu, 129. 
26 Sabah, 27 January 1995. 
54 
Fethullah Hoca's thoughts on democracy, Atatürk, and on Turkey's 
relations with the West have been welcomed with sympathy by some elite 
groups. He isa religious personality who is close to center-right parties. 
The interviews held by newspapers and the book published by Milliyet, 
Ufuk Turu, contribute to Fethullah Hoca's visibility. His views on lslamic 
metaphysics, on life and world of existence from a mystic perspective are 
appreciated by a lot of writers, journalists and academicians. According to 
Şerif Mardin, Fethullah Hoca's main contribution is the link he has established 
between the peripheral conditions and faith. He achieves this through the 
concept and methodology of a branch of mystic tradition and views, belonging 
to the scholastic school of lslamic hermeneutics. Fethullah Hoca claims that 
the way religion emerges in our social life, its massiveness and style are 
determined by peripheral conditions. 27 
With the help of this view, it becomes easier to accept the norms and 
institutions dictated by modern way of life. This provides a relief for the society 
whose ninety-nine percent is Muslim. A view which claims that outside the 
principles and premises of Islam, religion can be designed according to the 
very needs of the society and realizes the modernization of public life without 
changing their existing lifestyle and making it possible for them to claim that 
they are Muslims. 
Fethullah Hoca is not anxious to open such a door to religion because 
he is a representative of mystic tradition which accepts that it is not possible 
27 Can, Ufuk Turu, 169. 
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for the comman people to reach the reality. According to this elitist view, there 
are same people who have special abilities and those people can live a real 
religious life. There is an agreement that only those people who reach the 
highest level are not obliged to obey the rules of the Sharia. The other 
segments who inspired from the highest one obey the structural requirements 
of Islam but do not accept them as a link between the religion and spiritual 
reality as comman people do. This may seem to create a conflict but this is the 
distinction between the elite and the masses. 28 
Ali Yaşar Sarıbay claims that the interpretation of Islam by Fethullah 
Hoca includes both a pragmatic attitude and an attempt to make popular 
lslamic life-style uncommon. He perceives Fethullah Hoca and his group as 
urban people, scripturalist, which means that they are the representatives of 
"elitist Islam". But paradoxically, Sarıbay thinks that Fethullah Hoca becomes 
popular. Thus, he makes lslamic life more popular than before. 29 
In Christianity, Protestants played a key role in capitalist mentality's 
spreading in the society. Laçiner argues that Fethullah Hoca plays a similar 
role in Turkish society. Fethullah Hoca provides a divine legitimacy to those 
neo-liberal entrepreneurs. Thus, he is criticized by Mehmet Şevket Eygi for his 
resemblance to Protestant devout of Christian world who is fed by the trade 
partnership. Eygi explicitly stated that "Risale-i Nur should not be abused by 
28 Laçiner," Seçkinci ", 9. 
29 Can, Ufuk Turu, 170. 
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trade". 30 Prof. Dr.Arif Ersoy, one of the writers of "Just Order Programme", 
criticized the integration of religious groups with the economic system by 
saying that "efforts to reconcile Islam and capitalism has increased. Some try 
to fınd verses that are appropriate for capitalism". 31 Without any restraints to 
their economic initiatives, the followers of Fethulfah Hoca can realize every 
requirement of capitalist and neo-liberal system. Spiritual and divine premises 
of Fethullah Hoca will protect them from any criticism that may be directed to 
their visible (zahiri) existence style. Not only those economic elite but those 
political elite who because of their status must do things that seem to be 
incompatible with Islam, can consider themselves as Muslims. 
Laçiner argues that Fethullah Hoca proposes a master plan to the elite 
that aims at creating the "grandeur" of the ancestors in accordanca with the 
contemporary era's requirements. To quicken this process, he tries to carry 
the educational and indirectly investment activities which take place in a 
Sunnite-Turk geographic area from Adriatic to China Rampart. The success of 
these activities depends on good and effective relations between Turkey's 
mature elites anda state which functions systematically. This is the dream of 
Fethullah Hoca which is interesting for the elite who are bored up with the 
political patranage of the center-right parties. 32 
3
° Kemal Can, " Kapitalizme Uygun Ayet Aranıyor", Ateş, 2 November 1996. 
31 'b'd ı ı . 
32 Laçiner, "Seçkinci ", 9. 
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lt is not something new that those elite who rule and guide the society, 
take up these religio-mystic approaches seriously. What Fethullah Hoca refers 
to when he talks about "ancestors" is a tradition in the Ottoman Empire to 
which the high status elite, Muslim notables and enlightened people held in 
high esteem. 33 Even the most tyrannical viziers stood most respectfully in 
front of the sheikhs, respectfully listened to their advice and believed that in 
such a way they deansed up their souls. 
lt is important to note that Fethullah Hoca did not even say a word 
about common people, only he advised them to be loyal to the state. 
According to Sanbay, Fethullah Hoca's pragmatic attitude that consists 
of his rejection of the hostility against the West, his search for commonafities 
to provide a fertile ground for dialogue and the attempt to merge 
Enlightenment and madrasa in a college form has a function of inner-
secularization of Islam. For Sarıbay, secularism is not to show tolerance to 
different refigions, but it is the search for different interpretations in the same 
religion in order to fınd a common ground for compromise through tolerance. 34 
This is what Fethuflah Hoca tries to do. 
Fethullah Hoca and his group's voice have made the importance of 
interpretation (tefsir) and its relation with the dynamics of age apparent; thus 
the/ıegitimized the existence of different interpretations of Islam. All these 
highlight the pluralist characteristic of Islam. In the framework of these views 
33 "b"d ı ı . 
34 Sabah, 26 August 1995. 
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which accept the existence in the society of different lslamic or non-lslamic 
groups as natural, those voices like Fethullah Hoca's will be the tools of 
reform, that, is the adaption of Islam to the era through interpretation. 
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CHAPTERV 
FETHULLAH GÜLEN VERSUS NECMETTiN ERBAKAN'S PP? 
in the previous chapter, 1 have delineated the issues related to 
Fethullah Hoca's views on Islam and democracy. To understand why many 
people treat the PP as a threat to the existing order but take Fethullah Hoca 
and his group as an antidote to the PP, we need to address the question of 
what are the differences between Fethuilah Hoca's views and those of the PP. 
When Turkey moved from the 1980s to the 1990s, a polarization 
between the radical secularists and radical Muslims became more apparent. 
The strengthening of political Islam and the rise of the PP increased the 
sensitivity on the issue of secularism. At the same time, lslamic wave was 
increasing its popularity and it has gained a cultural weight that goes beyond 
its lines. In his article " Devlet islamı istiyor" (The State Wants Islam), Ruşen 
Çakır argues that lslamic culture, or religiousity, discourse should be 
considered as the part of culture at the center. At the first iook, it is not 
something new. The Republican generatian often heard from their 
grandfathers that they shouid ignore those bearded-fanatics, and that they 
themselves were the real Muslims. Thisisa Republican culture that confıned 
worship to the "mahrem" (confidentiai). Such a distancing was in conformity 
with the foundation ideology because in the talk about religiousity, there was 
stili an emphasis on secularism. But today what we see at the centre is an 
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lslamic culture which is a part of the popular identity and which places 
emphasis on religiousity when talking about secularism. 1 
From the 1980s onwards, one can observe the rise of fslamic identity. lt 
emergad in a context in which Kemalist nationslist discourse was taeing a 
serious identity erisis with its wifl to civilization no fonger capabfe of limiting the 
imagination of political community within the horizon of modemity.2 The search 
for a community both outside the terrain of and as a response to the Kemalist 
wifl to civilization has become and continues to be one of the significant sites 
of that has formed and stili gives maaning to Turkish politics in the 1990s. 3 At 
this point, there emergad a need for a social figure, a symbofie personality/ 
community as a solution to this crisis. 
The views about the PP, which ineressed its votes by the help of those 
who protested the system, has gradually changed; particularly when the PP 
became the coalition partner. The PP is not thought to constitute a threat to 
the system as it did before. (In fact, the number of people who do not share 
this view is not negfigible). Stili, personalities, groups or communities 
who/which will integrate the lslamic views, principles more moderatefy into the 
system, and help the existing order functron smoothly are prefered. These 
1 Ruşen Çakır, " Devlet islamı istiyor", Birikim, 55 (Nov 1993). 
2 Fuat Keyman," On the Relation Between Global Modemity and Nationalism: 
The Crisis of Hegemony and The Rise of (lslamic) ldentity In Turkey", New 
Perspectives On Turkey, 13 (Fall 1995), 113. 
3 ibid., 114. 
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moderate personalities and communities will make it possible to moderate 
those who are outside the lslamic community. 
A leader who will dissipate tension in the politics by uniting the cultural 
center, who will not challenge the order, who will not irritate the Republican 
culture -though representing the gains of lslamic culture- is searched for. 
Fethullah Hoca seems to be the most appropriate candidate for this mission. 
it can be claimed that the educational mobilization carried out by 
Fethullah Hoca group, a civil societal initiative, takes its power from lslamic 
and communal traditions specific to Anatolia. This civil mobilization stands as 
an antidote to "cultural breakdown" ideology which is supposed to feed 
political Islam. This last point brings forth the first difference between 
Fethullah Hoca and his group on the one hand, and the PP and Erbakan on 
the other to the scene. 
5. 1 Poiiticallslam versus Cu/tura/Islam 
The most significant difference between Erbakan -and the PP- and 
Fethuilah Hoca group is the former's representing political Islam whereas the 
latter's representing cultural Islam. The Joumalists' and Writers' Foundation 
whose spiritual leader is Fethullah Hoca has been compared with the PP by 
some columnists as folfows: "The foundation presents a pure Muslim 
altemative to the PP which carried political Islam to the power. This foundation 
represents a platform which stands against the radicals who reinforce a clear-
cut distinction between those supporting the PP CMuslims") and those not 
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and those not supporting the PP ("secularists" or "pagans"). 4 At the centre of 
the platform in question stands Fethullah Hoca. 
The PP's main political aim is to grasp power, for this reason they 
compete in the elections. They are willing to use and exploit the opportunities 
that a self-proclaimed democratic system, by its own logic, is bound to offer 
them.5 After 24 December 1995 general elections, Erbakan declared that 
people wanted to see the PP in the government. He added that democracy 
means canforming to what the masses demand. Erbakan said: "1 know 
Demirel very well. He will do what a democracy requires. He will give me the 
duty of establishing the government as the leader of a party which obtained 
the majority of the votes in the elections". 6 
In contrast, Fethullah Hoca's mavement is a social mavement whose 
aim is to reconstruct the daily life of Muslims. In an interview made by Ali 
Bulaç, Fethullah Hoca was asked whether he will black the PP's political Islam 
and/or he will be an alternative to the PP. Fethullah Hoca's answer was as 
follows: "Those brothers in the PP come up with the same allegation against 
us. But the arena they chose for service is different from ours. They prefer to 
be in active politics. Thisisa view and an interpretation. We cannot have any 
objections to their choice or preference. But the arena of activity which we find 
4 Şeref Oğuz, " Kökten Hoşgörücüler ", Milliyet, 2 October 1995. 
5 Bemard Lewis, " Islam and Liberal Democracy ", Atlantic Monthly, 271 (Feb 
1993), 90. 
6 Hürriyet, 26 December 1995. 
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appropriate is education, the mission of bringing up auspicious people. In the 
educational institutions we have established, we tıy to bring up persons with 
high morals. Thus, different activities and different arenas to serve should be 
considered as a division of labor. To answer your question, no religious 
community can be an alternative to the other. We do not constitute an 
obstacle to the PP, we do not have such an intention". 7 
Erbakan seems to have a view paraUel to that of Fethullah Hoca. He 
was also asked if Fethullah Hoca can be an alternative to the PP. Erbakan 
replied: " Fethullah Gülen is tried to be brought to the agenda deliberately to 
block the PP. But Fethullah Gülen is also a person among us".8 Stili, one may 
speak of the latent power struggle between Fethullah Hoca and Erbakan. 
Fethullah Hoca is against the politicallslam of the PP. This is evident in 
his claim that politicizing Islam is the biggest insult toward religion. In an 
interview with Yalçın Doğan at the TV channel "Kanal D" on 17 April, 1997 
Fethullah Hoca blamed the PP and Erbakan for causing damage to the regime 
and the religion. He went further and said that there is not any spiritual tie 
between Erbakan and him. There is, in fact, an incompatibility between their 
souls because Erbakan politicized Islam. When a religion is politicized, 
Fethullah Hoca continued, this will result in the exploitation of politics for the 
politicians' self-interest. At the same time, religion will degenerate; politicians 
may claim that they are the representatives of the religion. That is why, 
7 Ali Bulaç," Fethullah Hoca'ya Üç Soru", Yeni Şafak, 12 July 1996. 
8 Milliyet, 27 February 1995. 
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although he often met with Yılmaz, Çiller, Ecevit, Demirel, and Türkeş, 
Fethullah Hoca did not meet with Erbakan. 9 
Fethullah Hoca once said: "Unfortunately we see the adverse results of 
the politicization of Islam". He thinks that the PP accelerates the process of 
polarization in the soc.iety. For him, secular-religious polarization creates a 
major problem for Turkey. In contrast to politicallslam represented by the PP, 
Fethullah Hoca is the champion of a moderate Islam which is compatible with 
the secular order. 
In the same TV program, Fethullah Hoca irritated the PP members of 
parliament, the ministers and the media supporting the PP by asking the 
Refah-Yol ( Prosperity-Path) coalition government to resign. He claimed that 
those who are in power then do not perform well enough to govern Turkey. 
So, they should admit that they have failed and they should give the trust back 
to the people. He gave examples from Hz. Ebubekir (one of the four 
caliphates) and Omer Bin Abdülaziz who returned to the people the trust by 
declaring that their burden had become too heavy for them. This iS a 
signifıcant example of Republican, democratic perception of government. 10 
Fethullah Hoca also criticized Erbakan and the ministers of the PP for their 
9 Milliyet. 18 April 1997. 
10 Gündem, 18 April1997. 
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"ihram" (seamless garment worn by pilgrims in Mecca) show-offat Ankara's 
Esenboğa Airport. 11 
Fethullah Hoca gave support to the 28 February 1997 National Security 
Council (NSC) decisions which the PP were unwilling to apply. About the 
NSC, he said: .. the duty of the NSC was designated in the Constitution. If they 
say that they are for protecting the securtty of the country and if they perceive 
a threat to the security of the country, we cannot blame them". 12 Fethullah 
Hoca emphasized the appropriateness of the NSC decisions and stated that 
"The military have power: weapon. if that weapon were in the hands of other 
people, they would have intervened. But as the military is loyal to democracy, 
they do not do this. The government should not insist on not applying the 
decisions of the NSC ".13 
Fethullah Hoca aiso supported the eight-year-uninterrupted secular 
education which is not accepted by the PP members. He stated : "This 
problem can be solved by reaching a consensus. Those who want can send 
their children to school of theology. Half of the students who go to the Faculty 
of Theology come from the other "secular'' lycees. One can go to the school of 
preachers and prayer leaders after fınishing the secondary school" .14 
11 Milliyet, 18 April1997. 
12 Hürriyet, 18 April1997. 
13 Milliyet, 18 April 1997. 
14 "b"d ı ı . 
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Fethullah Hoca frequently emphasizes that he is not involved in politics; 
he claims to be above and beyond politics. Thus, when he met with Tansu 
Çiller, this created a seandaL A discussion went on between Mehmet Şevki 
Eygi, a writer in the PP's semiofficial newspaper Milli Gazete and Taha Kıvanç 
(Fehmi Koru}, a writer in the Fethullah Hoca's newspaper, Zaman, because of 
Fethullah Hoca's assumed rapproachment with the True Path Party. Fethullah 
Hoca argued that it was not a pofiticaf meeting. 
The recent events, Fethullah Hoca's criticisms about the PP in the 
Yalçın Doğan's TV program, his call for the govemment's resignation, his 
support for the NSC again brought into question Fethullah Hoca's claim that 
he is not invofved in politics. According to ömer Laçiner, Fethullah Hoca and 
his group have a larger pofitical aim then the PP and/or the other centre-right 
parties. 15 That is why Laçiner thinks that the difference between the PP and 
Fethullah Hoca is not refated to whether Fethullahcıs prefer to be out of 
politics or not. Although both sides indicate that this is the foremost significant 
difference between them, Laçiner thinks that this does really not reflect the 
reality. 
For the PP, the goal of politics is power, like all other political parties. 
Whatever change it proposesin its party program, they will not change their 
basic political goal. lt promises to bring about an economic, political and social 
order which is based on lslamic premises and which wilf be realized through 
15 ömer Laçiner," Postmodern Bir Dini Hareket: Fethullah Hoca 
Cemaati".Birikim, 76 (Aug 1995}, 10. 
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power. This is the thought shared by those who want to live an lslamic style of 
life freely and who see the state as an obstacle to that aim. 
Fethulfah Hoca and his group also want to be powerful, but they do not 
aim at creating a dominant lslamic styfe of life. Then why do they want to be 
powerful? They want to be powertur for getting rid of things which made 
lslamic world inferior in comparison to the Christian world. As noted before, 
this is the modernized form of both Jamal al-Din Afghani and Said-i Nursi's 
views.16 Fethullah Hoca and his group do not hesitate to borrow from the 
West in science and industry which Said-i Nursi defıned as materiaf. In fact 
this is a modemist attitude. 
These views are not, of course, alien to the PP because it does not 
promise only an lslamic life style to Muslims but also promises a powerful 
Turkey which wilf challenge the power of the West. From the 1970s onwards, 
Erbakan came up with a program of heavy industry attempt and recognized 
the need to be powerfuf. What differentiates Erbakan and Fethullah Hoca is 
their perception about the conception of power. Whereas Erbakan perceives it 
as an infrastructure problem, Fethullah Hoca perceives it as a problem of 
cadres. Fethuffah Hoca does not deny the importance of infrastructure 
problem but he assumes that the establishment of an elite cadre which will 
consist of people who are skilfful and have refined knowledge in aU sectors, is 
more urgent than the heavy industry. For him, bringing up a group of elite who 
16 
"b"d 5 ı 1 ., . 
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will constitute the web of managing and directing is the prerequisite of power. 
These words will support his argument: "We ask to those who want to change 
the state : Do you have an alternative state in mi nd? If there will be instability, 
you should not destroy the state before providing an alternative". 17 lt is 
obvious that for Fethullah Hoca and his group, the PP does not constitute an 
altemative state. 
One may now better appreciate why Fethullah Hoca and his group try 
to expand the gigantic organization they have developed for education. These 
schools are the places to bring up elite cadres. Other religious communities 
which establish educational institutions for donation chose the poor to attend 
their schools whereas in the schools established by the Fethullah Hoca group, 
some very difficult tests are applied to students before they are admitted. The 
selected students are the ones who are the most successful in the national 
and international scholarly achievement tests. 
According to Laçiner, Fethullah Hoca's attempt is a postmodern 
religious mavement which is a mixture of Turkish nationalism, traditional 
political Islam, neoliberal thesis under the second industrial revolution's elitist 
powerful state/society project. Laçiner argues that the PP is a modem 
movement. Although it mentions "Shariah" when it makes referances to the 
state and society, it gets its content through modemity. lt thinks within the 
context of modernity, with its concepts and its institutions. So the challenge of 
17 ibid., 11. 
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political Islam against modernity ended up in internalization of modernity. 18 
The Fethullah Hoca group phenomenon is the indicator of the fact that lslamic 
mavement realized this internalization at the beginning of post modern era 
which indicates that lslamic mavement synchronized with the age. 
According to Laçiner, for the alternative state to be prepared, there isa 
need for stability and order which the existing state should provide. Thus, 
Fethullah Hoca and his group perceive the PP asa threat to the existing order 
and try to prevent instability in the polity.19 
Both the PP and Fethullah Hoca group are involved in politics. But they 
differ canceming methods and strategy they employed for grasping political 
power; they alsa have different goals. Furthermore their target groups are 
different. On these issues, there is cansensus in the Fethullah Hoca group but 
in the PP, there are factions. There is a possibility that same in the PP may 
give support to Fethullah Hoca group which cambines the mystic tradition with 
an elitist attitude. 2° Fethullah Hoca himself decided that it was time to get out 
of the cacaon which for many years they have been knitting. He said: ult is 
time for us to get out of the cocoon. Of course 1 have doubts about this. But 
many of my friends told me to go and explain things to the people "?1 One 
18 Laçiner, " Postmodern", 5. 
19 
"b"d 6 ı ı ., . 
20 "b"d ı ı . 
21 Eyüp Can, Ufuk Turu. (istanbul: AD Yayıncılık, 1996 ), 18. 
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should remember that this flight from the cocoon happened to be at the end of 
1994, at a time when an election in 1995 seemed to be very likely and the PP 
seemed to have a good chance at elections. If the PP became the first party in 
the next elections, they could create a situation such that Fethullah Hoca and 
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his group would have no chance to maintain their autonomy; or the PP could 
have brought some legal restrictions to the activities of the Fethullah Hoca 
group. This explains the power struggle between the two- the PP and the 
Fethullah Hoca group. 
As noted, there is a difference in the strategy of the PP representing 
political Islam and Fethullah Hoca and his group representing the new path. 
As the PP prefered employing a strategy which appears to middle class 
people, they followed a style of propaganda which appeals to middle class 
people's religious feelings. In the 1990s, in addition to religious factor-
especially in metropoles- their discourse included economic and social factors. 
The PP promised "job, soup, prosperity, security ... " to the electorate. This new 
identity of the party caused a change in the segments of the society from 
which the PP members receive votes. Those lower class people who were 
alienated from the system as a result of migratian from the rural to urban 
areas began to vote for the PP. So, there are mainly three segments of 
society who support the PP. These are: first, middle scale Anatolian 
merchants; second group consists of those conservative people who try to 
show their protest about the tension created as a result of modernization 
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attempts; third group incfudes peopfe who have no hope for the existing order 
and support any altemative that promises a radical change. 22 
As noted, in contrast to the PP, Fethuflah Hoca and his group try to 
appeaf to the high segments of Turkish society, the economic and politicaf 
elite. First group of themes in Fethuflah Hoca's discourse refers to such things 
as power, efficacy, impertal vision, Picasso representing refined cufture, art 
themes. This group of themes is refated to the prerequisite of their existence, 
status of the elite or the satisfied masses. 23 Fethullah Hoca claims that they 
have never attempted to estabfish a mass movement and benefit form the 
mass psychofogy because it brings chaos. Fethullah Hoca thinks that such 
exploitation woufd brtng many benefits but at the same time the unsatisfied 
masses wifl bring destruction. He expresses his view that the way with the 
unsatisfied masses is an unappreaciated way, it is not a Muslim saintway but 
it is an ambitious way to power.24 Fethullah Hoca's distinction between the 
community and society is afso meaningful. For him, community is composed 
of peopfe who share commen thoughts and feefings as a consequence of 
frequent interaction. At the same time, commen befiefs bring peopfe together. 
Those peopfe who believe that fest prayer <Bayram Namazı) is necessary 
(vacip) cannot escape from meeting in one's mosque. But society is different. 
22 Naci Bostancı, • RP'yi Anlamak", Türkiye Günlüğü, 38 (Jan-Feb 1996), 69. 
23 Laçiner, "Postmodern", 6. 
24 Can, Ufuk Turu, 19. 
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Of course, peopfe come together to actualize an aim but with whom you live 
in this society is important. There can be unsatisfied people who do not share 
common feelings and thoughts. In society, people come together temporarily. 
There are no continuous bonds among them. lt is more appropriate to caıı 
them masses who come together for their particularistic interests. They 
dissoJve very quickly.25 
Second group of themes reters to talks on metaphysics which is 
omamented with rich mystic tradition. This group of themes is related to the 
search of the elite for maaning in such a transitional age.26 Thus, Fethullah 
Hoca's discourse is a mixture of these themes prepared to call out to the elite 
cad re. 
What differentiates Fethullah Hoca group from other groups is the 
importance they give to timing- to do the right thing at the right time and at the 
right place.27 lt isa detailed strategy, the core dimension of which is patience, 
waiting until the most propitious point before taking an action. While 
responding to a question asked about the timing of going to Middle Asia 
Fethullah Hoca said: "Some went to Russia just before the dissofution 
happened. In fact our friends had been in Bakü when the dissolution's speed 
25 ibid., 23. 
26 Laçiner, " Postmodern ", 6. 
27 Kozanoğlu, internet, 68. 
73 
was accelerated. They had entered the country at the right time". 28 This 
strategist approach distinguishes Fethullah Hoca from the radicals. 
As noted before, anather difference between Fethullah Hoca group and 
the PP is the former's being an elitist cadre mavement whereas the latter's 
being a populist movement. For Fethullah Hoca, the aim of education is to 
bring up an elite group, a "Goiden Generation", to put his grandeur plan into 
practice. Ali Yaşar Sarıbay labels Fethullah Hoca group's perception of Islam 
as an "elitist Islam", represented by a group of urban, scripturalist people. 
In contrast, as the PP is based on a mass movement; it tries to 
reconcile the interests of people and carries populist policies. Consequently, it 
cannot have an elitist attitude. 
Recent events may take one to rethink about Fethullah Hoca's 
canception of Islam. One may ask whether Fethullah Hoca represents poiitical 
Islam or cultural Islam. lt is true that he does not have any intention of 
establishing a political party and competing in elections, that is Fethullah Hoca 
is not involved in active politics. But Ahmet insel may be right when he argues 
that by providing a divine legitimacy to entrepreneurs through elitist mystic 
tradition, Fethullah Hoca's mavement may take the colorings of masonry that 
also distances itself from politics but tries to expand its influence through 
28 Can, Ufuk Turu, 17. 
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positioning its members everywhere. Thisisa common strategy of politicians 
who sacrifice today for the sake of tomorrow. 29 
5.2 Central Asia Versus Middle East 
There is anather difference between Fethullah Hoca and Erbakan. 
Fethuflah Hoca places emphasis on the Centraf Asia whereas Erbakan 
focuses his attention on the Middle East. In an interview, when Ali Bulaç 
asked Fethullah Hoca why he selected to pay attention to the Central Asia, 
but not to the Middle East, Hoca responded as follows: '"Wıth the 
disintegration of the USSR, the Turkic states were liberated. Timing is very 
important canceming the Central Asia. This region should not be fet go. If 
Turkish educators and entrepreneurs did not go there, others would have 
gone and had an advantage in comparison to others. With the appropriate 
tools and methods applied, it is possibte to rehabilitate Central Asian republics 
and integrate them into the lslamic world.30 Fethullah Hoca also noted that 
"because we share a common history, Asian people have more sympathy 
towards us than the Arabs". 31 Fethullah Hoca indicated that "others tried to set 
up relations with the Middle Eastem countries. But up to this year, Iraq was 
closed to them. This year in the Northem Iraq, one college has begun to show 
29 Ahmet insel, "Yeni Muhafazakarlık ve Fethullah Hoca", Yeniyüzyıl, 27 
April 1997. 
30 Ali Butaç," Fethullah Hoca'ya üç Soru", Yeni Şafak, 13 July 1995. 
31 Can, Ufuk Turu, 61. 
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activity. The relations with Syria were bad. Neither Tunisia nor Egypt had a 
will to support Fethullah Hoca's attempt to open up schools. The worst thing 
about the Middle East is that in Saudi Arabia one cannot even demand to 
open up schools, because even the schools which were established before, 
were closed. In addition to this, Arabs think that they know Islam better than 
the other people. And this feeiing of superiority led the Arabs to have 
condescending aWtude toward other Mushms". 32 
Fethullah Hoca accepts Asia asa corridor which will unite Turkey with 
the Middle East and the Pacifıc. He claimed that this will be an integration in 
feelings, thought and faith. Consequently, if such an integration is achieved , 
later, integration at the states !eve! wiU be inevitable.33 
5.3 Customs Union (lntegration to the European Union) 
Customs Union is another issue on which Fethullah Hoca and Erbakan 
have different views. When Erbakan is asked "why are you opposed to 
Customs Union, when, for example, Fethullah Gülen is said to support 
integration to European Union?", he responds in a sarcastic manner: 
UFethullah Hoca has a good intention; he thinks that it will be usefui to 
introduce Islam to Europeans".34 This is, of course, an evasive answer. !n fact 
32 Bulaç, Yeni Şafak, 13 July 1995. 
33 Can, Ufuk Turu, 61. 
34 Sabah. 6 June 1995. 
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Erbakan argues that Customs Union - integration with the West- would be 
harmful to Turkey. Erbakan once said: " Çifler argues that she wifl carry the 
mosque near the church. But this is absurd. We should join the lslamic world 
with 1,5 thousand million Muslims in it".35 What Erbakan has in mind is a 
Muslim brotherhood, integration with the Arabic-Muslim countries. His trip to 
Iran, Libya, Egypt was the first step to realize his dream "lslamic Union". After 
the centirmation of Turkey's acceptance to the Customs Union, Erbakan said 
that "we will tear that rag agreement. When we come to power in eleven 
days' time, we wifl not recognize it. Like the Sevr Treaty, we will tear it. We will 
not fet the West colonize Turkey. He went further and criticized Çiller: " A 
rational person cannot leave the lslamic Union and try to make himself/herself 
servant to the West". 36 On anather occasion, Erbakan declared: "The Rome 
Treaty was signed near the Pope whose aim is to unite all the European 
states under one name. They will carry the same passport In a near future, 
lsrael wiU join the Comman Market. ı do not want to carry the same passport 
with Solamon ". 37 
Fethullah Hoca thinks that with the passage of time our national 
feelings and thoughts become out of date and lose their effect. Because of 
globalization, the state should adopt new policies. He is aware of the fact that 
hostility toward the West will push Turks out of age and in time they will be 
Js Hasan Cemal," Erbakan Hoca Çok Keyifli", Sabah, 6 June 1995. 
36 Sabah, 4 December 1995. 
J7 Cumhuriyet. 24 December 1989. 
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eliminated from the global order. He says: "Before the Customs Union, ı had 
some doubts about integration to the European Union. Because at that time 
the experts of economy, academicians thought that Turkish society was not 
ready for such an integration. My doubt was that an assimifation could 
happen. Because we were passing through difficult times. But from that day to 
today, a rapid and uninterrupted change occurred. Both in Turkey and abroad, 
Turks moved closer to their spiritual roots. Under such circumstances, the 
integration of Turkish society to the West could take place. If Turkey 
maintained its own dynamics, beliefs and pursued a reasonable policy, it 
would not lose anything when the integration was achieved". 38 lt was for this 
reason that Fethullah Hoca complained about Erbakan's Arabization policies; 
he had doubts about the wisdom of Erbakan's trip to Nigeria, Libya and Iran 
immediately after he became prime minister. According to Fethullah Hoca, this 
woufd have harmed Turkey's relations with the West, especiallly with the 
United States. In fact, Fethullah Hoca evaluated the project of the PP about 
the cooperation with the lslamic countries unrealizable. He states that the 
conjuncture in the world is not convenient for such a cooperation because 
each of those lslamic countries is dependent on the Westem countries and 
neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran are the exceptions. Thus, if the Westem 
countries do not approve such cooperation, lslamic countries can not put it 
into practice. For Fethullah Hoca, 08 (a project which aims at uniting the 
38 Can, Ufuk Turu, pp. 45-6. 
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lslamic countries) is proposedas a cheap message for some people to cast 
their votes to the PP. 39 
5. 4 Fethullah Hoca Group, PP and Nationalism 
Fethuflah Hoca has a nationslist centricist and statist approach. In his 
memoirs. he has indicated that his first potttical action started in Erzurum by 
founding the Association for the Struggle with Communism. 40 A keen 
nationalism which was mainly found in the Nationalist Action Party and one 
that originated from" Oadaş soul" dominated the whole discourse of Fethulfah 
Hoca claims Hakan Yavuz.'u Thus, in those regions, there isa state-centric 
canception of Islam. Consequently, etatism is the natural complementary of 
Fethullah Hoca's conceptualization of nationalism. However, as Fethullah 
Hoca encourages free enterprise and tries to arnpower his community with the 
help of free enterprtse methods, his etatism is not economic but politicaf. 
In a wortd where nationalism and etatism dominate, Islam becomes 
functional. In such a milieu, Islam becomes a bearer of tradition from which 
the state and nation originate. This brings the domestication and 
functionalization of lslam in nation-state tradition. 42 
39 Yeniyüzyii, 22 July 1997. 
40 Latif Erdoğan, KOçük Dünyam. ( lstanbul: AD Yayıncılık, 1995 ), 142. 
41 Şahin Alpay's interview with Hakan Yavuz, Milliyet, 3 August 1996. 
42 insel, Yeniyüzyıl, 27 April1997. 
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What is the rafationship between Islam and nationalism in the PP? The 
National Salvation Party (NSP)- the party whose legacy the PP carries- has 
had a nationalist-conservative tradition until the 1970s. At the end of 1970, a 
separate lslamic line emerged; rather than focating Islam in the nationafist-
conservative tradition, Islam was perceived as an independent worfdview. 
One part of this attempt was to purify Islam from the traces of nationalism. 
At the turn of the century, the tradition of lslamism, which rejected 
nationalism because it regarded nationalism as racismltribism, was revived. 
In 1980s, in addition to the attempts of reviving the traditional "ümmetçi" 
dream, modem lsfamic inteflectuals questioned the notions of nation-state and 
nationalism in the context of modernity.43 
But the lsfamic wave of the 1980s was to some extent inherited by the 
PP. Also the radical questioning of nationalism by radical lslamism was 
softened and this soft version was adopted by the PP. Thus, the PP, both in 
its base and its discourse, did not break away from nationalist-conservative 
line competefy. Stiff, from time to time, by rejecting to participate in the 
nationslist ceremonies, they symbolicafly resisted the official nationalism. lt 
cannot be denied that an implicit conflict goes on between the PP and the 
official nationalism. The seandal lived in Libya during Erbakan's trip- the 
Qaddafi scandaf- is the most striking example of this pofiticaf conflict. 
43 Tanıl Bora," islamcılıktaki Milliyetçilik ve Refah Partisi", Birikim, 91 
(Nov 1996), 22. 
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According to Tanıl Bora, it is not the refinement of the PP from nationalism, 
but it is the different canception of nationalism held by the PP that stands 
behind this conflict. 44 
The most visible (observable) layer of the PP's nationalism was the 
potential to hold hostile attitudes against the "other" or the "alien". Hatred 
deriving from the " national questions" like Cyprus, Bosnia, and the like could 
easily lead to the use of inflated words such as "blood-lineage-race" -the 
vulgar examples of racism and chauvinism (here the Greek, the Armenian 
represent the West, and the hatred was against the West). 
The perception of enemy by Turkish lslamism went beyond the 
perception of enemy by Turkish nationalism because of the enemy 
confıguration at the centre of which the "paganism" factor stood. Because of 
this factor, they perceived their enemy as incorrigible whereas official 
nationalism thought they were Kurds, lslamists; this increased the severity of 
the Turkish lslamism's hostility against their "enemies". 45 
The racism in the lslamic discourse exclusively targets the non-Muslim 
nations. However, this does not refer to a pure internalization of lslamic 
nations; the PP's lslamism is Turkey-centered. Because Turkey is considered 
as the potentialleader of the lslamic world and its union. Being an heir to the 
Ottomans saddles Turkey with that mission. According to the ısıamic media, 
44 "b"d ı ı . 
45 ibid., 23. 
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the lslamic world is aware of the fact that the only country/leader that can 
rescue lslamic world from humility is Turkey/Erbakan. That is why those 
humiliated countries expecting to be rescued by Erbakan try to cooperate with 
him. With this "nationalist" rationale, the ministers and intellectuals of the PP 
tried to justify the trips to Iran, Libya, Egypt which were highly criticized. Using 
the lslamic card willl make it possible to adopt an international policy which will 
make Turkey the most powerful in the region. The symbolic example of this 
justification was the emphasis of Abdullah Gül (one of the ministers of the PP) 
on the gratifıcation of the Egyptian minister because the roots of his family 
went back to Turks.46 
Nationalism isa project of homogenization. The norm of the Hunity and 
integrity" of the Turkish state is what the nationalism in question aim at. 
Nationalism in the action and discourse of the PP is very much related to this 
function of nationalism. Because of their desire to integrate with the system, 
the PP members give much more emphasis on Hunity and integrity" which 
confines the PP to the patterns of current nationalist ideology. In fact, this is 
more evident in Fethullah Hoca's canception of nationalism. Just because he 
concerns with "unity and integrity of the Turkish state", he never objects to 
the state. Even he lived difficult times in the 12 September 1980 period, he 
had never an attempt to struggle with the state. Fethullah Hoca argued that 
even a bad government was better than anarchism. 47 
46 "b"d ı ı . 
47 Akşam, 29 January 1997. 
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The claims of the PP about changing the order seem to cease because 
of the emphasis given to "unity and integrity". However, what the PP members 
have in mind by "nation-state" and "nationalism" concepts is changing the 
definition of the nation and its perception. The project of the PP can be 
considered a project of reconstruction of the nation. From this point, we can 
mention the unique nationalism canception of the PP which is proposed as an 
alternative to the current forms of nationalism. 
The PP emphasizes "true-nation" and "true nationalism". lt is evident 
that "true", here, reters to "lslamism". lt isa perception of nation which does 
not only take Islam as one of the identity dimensions- even though it is the 
most crucial one- but it uses Islam for the construction of nation as a base that 
will function as a political-legal ordely arrangement (rabıta}. Such a canception 
of nation, according to lslamic inteflectuals, differs from the Western nation-
state structurally. The lslamic perception of nation should be sharply 
distinguished from a "nation" conceptualization which excludes the "sacred" 
on the secular basis and presents a "canstructed society" model. According to 
Omer Çelik, lslamic nation should be defıned as an ''accurate" (true) organic 
community. "Accurate" or "true" which means that it relies on truly legitimate 
sources and genuine or pure in quality; organic means natural, a community 
which exists spontaneously.48 
48 Tanıl Bora," islamcılıktaki Milliyetçilik ve Refah Partisi", Birikim, 91 
{Nov 1996), 24. 
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Tanı! Bora thinks that this conception of nation which is specifıc to 
Islam has kinship with romantic and conservative nationalism.49 Against the 
nation and nationalism, the message of lslamism was "the true nationalism" 
that is based upon sacred refereces. The lslamic discourse, especialfy the 
discourse of the PP, exalts the nation which is considered to be sacred 
community. One comman characteristics of the nationalism in question is to 
praise and glorify the past. The PP's alternative lslamic nation also did the 
same thing. Thus, Tanıl Bora states that contrary to the reterence of 
sacredness and trueness of nationalism, the alternative nation discourse of 
lslamism is more convenient to retum back to the bosom of the nation.50 
49 "b"d ı ı . 
50 ibid., 25. 
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CHAPTERVf 
CONCLUSION 
One can claim that in recent years Islam has been integrated into 
Turkish democracy. The successful incorporation of the religiously-oriented 
has been a consequence of an interactive relationship between Islam and 
democracy. In the mid-1990s, the leaders of the influential brotherhoods, 
movements and sects seem to be fairly integrated into the secular demecratic 
state and display more moderate views than before. 
In the 1950s, the discourse of the brotherhoods, sects and religious 
orders was political quietism. During multi-party period, there was a tacit 
contract between religious brotherhoods and the secularist political parties-
"you leave us alone and we support you politically". Today, they take on a 
more activist role by functioning as lobbies for the economic ventures 
established by the lslamist groups in several sectors- such as education, 
construction, banking. Those brotherhoods, sects and religious orders have, 
in the past few years , tended to concentrate their efforts on providing welfare 
servicesfor the public which require money. For this reason, since the 1980s, 
the lslamist sector in the economy has expanded with large-scale holding 
companies, investment houses, banks and insurance companies. Thereby, 
they have established strong links with the market economy and the 
government. 1 
1 Sencer Ayata, " Patronage, Party, And State: The Politicization of Islam in 
Turkey", Middle East Journal, 50 (Winter 1996), 51. 
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Yet, one cannot talk about a smooth relationship between the lslamists 
and the secularists. From the beginning of the 1980s, social divisions have 
been based on two opposing conceptions of social and political order: the 
lslamist versus the secularist. lt is the issue of secularism which polarizes the 
society. In fact, the problem occurs as a resurt of the irreconciliable attitudes 
on both sides. As Fethullah Hoca told there exist fanatics both on the side of 
the lslamists and the secularists. What the radical lslamists want is to 
establish an lslamic state like in Iran. They perceive anybody who is against 
their desire as enemy. On the other side, the radical secularists perceive 
Islam as the antonym of Enligtenment and equate any kind of preoccupation 
with Islam as the road to the irrational. 2 At this point, one can claim that the 
tolerant stance of Fethullah Hoca may contribute to the amelioration of the 
relations between the radicals on both sides. Then, let us see how far 
Fethullah Hoca may advance on the road to the reconciliation of Islam and 
democracy in Turkish context. 
The re-interpretation of Islam by Fethullah Hoca constitutes a support 
for consolidation of democracy in Turkey. At this conjuncture, the views of 
Fethullah Hoca which carry much more importance are, as indicated in the 
previous chapter: democracy, tolerance, being a Muslim in Turkey. 
Fethullah Hoca's meeting with Fener Rum Patriarch Barthelomeos 
should be appreciated for its being the harbinger of tolerance and civility 
2 Metin Heper, • Islam and Democracy in Turkey Toward A Reconciliation ?", 
Middle East Journal, (Jan 1997). 
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because it is the fırst meeting of a civil community leader with a Christian 
religious teader after the proclamation of the Republic. This indicates that 
"official Islam" is being transcended. Muslim-Christian, religious relations are 
canalized to their natural processes. Fethullah Hoca argues that the most 
important thing for the well-functioning of a society is dependent on tolerance. 
He adds that tolerance can only be achieved with love of serence and of man. 
Fethullah Hoca has developed a notion "being a Muslim in Turkey". The 
contribution of this concept is that the freedom and plurality-oriented Anatolian 
Islam stands against lslamists who try to imitate those Arabic countries in 
using Islam for the establishment of a separate authoritarian regime through 
ideofogizing it. Fethullah Hoca evaluates lran's interpretation of Islam as 
fanatic. That is why he thinks Turkey can never be an Iran regarding the 
establishment of an lslamic state because the interpretation of Islam by 
lranians and Turks are different. He thinks the source from which they took 
Islam also differs. The crux is that Fethullah Hoca does not believe that the 
religion- Islam is one. He claims that culture of a nation plays a key role in re-
interpretation of Islam. The Iranian people dowhat the region they are living in 
requrre. Fethullah Hoca argues that in that region, it is not possible to 
establish a rule that is not based on religion. But for the lranians, the most 
crucial thing is Ali (the teader of Shiites), rather than Quran. For rnstance, Iran 
exports a fanatic and sect-based understanding of Islam under the name of 
religion and lslamic revolution. They give primacy to their sect over the 
religion-lsfam. That is why they are always reactionary to the societies which 
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mostly consist of the Sunni groups. For Fethullah Hoca, their reactionary 
nature prevents them thinking and deciding rightly. 
Fethullah Hoca and his group's voice shows the importance of 
interpretation and its relation with the dynamics of age. Emphasizing the 
pluralistic character - existence of several different understandings and groups 
within Islam- of Islam, Fethullah Hoca reveals the fact that lslamic 
communities in Turkey should be considered as an essence of civil society. Ali 
Yaşar Sarıbay argues that Fethullah Hoca's emphasis on the plurality of 
commonalities for the dialogue, his point on the war of dogmas, his rejection 
of uselass Westem hostility constitute the basis for an inner-secularization of 
lslam.3 By providing, inner-secularization of Islam, Fethullah Hoca is rasping 
the radical parts of Islam; therefore, moderation, admiration for Kant -that is to 
Enlightenment thought- may be the characteristics of him that may contribute 
to the consolidation of democracy in Turkey. That is why the secularists 
should not use his discourse, which includes the elements of modernity, to 
deaf with the fegitimacy and meaning crisis. In fact, Can Kazanoğlu calfs 
Fethurtah Hoca a ·new-age leamed person "who makes a by-pass operation 
to deadlocks in Turkish politics; so he thinks Fethullah Hoca is proposedas a 
figure to come up with solutions for the meaning and legitimacy crisis. 4 
3 Can, Ufuk Turu, 170. 
4 Kozanoğlu, internet, 85-6. 
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However, Fethullah Hoca's worldview should be evaluated as a praxis which 
tries to incorporate Islam into democracy. 
These are the contributions of Fethullah Hoca, as the leader of a civil 
societal initiative to consolidation of democracy in Turkey. This is one side of 
the medallion. The other side is about the criticisms about Fethullah Hoca. 
What are the criticisms that can bemade about Fethullah Hoca ? The 
main criticism is his excessive emphasis on etatism and nationalism. In terms 
of cultural and ideological continuity, Fethullah Hoca insists on the significance 
of nationalism and etatism; on the other hand, he conceptualizes Islam in 
relation to tradition -the tradition should bear Islam and Islam should diffuse in 
tradition. This constitutes a dilemma that will affect Fethullah Hoca and his 
group adversely in terms of his contribution to democratization. Because 
Fethullah Hoca emphasizes the ideological continuity of Kemalism, he is 
dragged to a conservative position and this damages Fethullah Hoca's 
modernity (carrying the society to the future) claim. Ali Bayramoğlu indicates 
that in this country what stands as an obstacle in front of cultural continuity is 
ideological continuity, that is strong etatism and centralization. 5 
lt is interesting that Fethullah Hoca did not hesitate to say that every 
person who was from Erzurum was pan-Turanist when he was born. That is 
why when he was asked his views on Said-i Nursi, he states: "lt is a 
manifestation of fate that Bediüzzaman (refers to Said-i Nursi) is from the 
5 Ali Bayramoğlu," Cemiyet ile Devlet Arasında", Yeniyüzyıl. 2 November 
1996. 
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Southwestern part of Turkey. But ı was interested in him for the sake of 
religion. Even Hz. Muhammed came from the Arabic nations. This must have 
its rationale, inner meaning. From time to time, ı have different feelings 
(negative) about Bediüzzaman, but 1 repressed them".6 Here, Fethullah Hoca 
regrets Bediüzzaman's having a Kurdish origin. In fact, these words indicate 
that he even regrets Hz. Muhammed's having an Arabic origin. Thus, one can 
extrapolate that FethuJiah Hoca has an exclusionary attitude toward those 
non-Turkish people. 
One criticism about F ethullah Hoca is that although he claims to be 
above and beyond politics, recent events (his call for the Prosperity-Path 
coalition government to resignation, his declaration of his views about the 
NSC openly) indicate that he is very much invofved in politics. This is a danger 
for Fethulfah Hoca and his group. That is, if his group extends its effect from 
cultural wor1d to pofitical world, this wilf bring a deadfock, risk of fosing its civil 
character and politicize cultural and social functions more than need which 
Fethullah Hoca cfaims to avoid himseff. What is disappointing about this, is a 
loss of pluralism, civility, debate, religious reform in Turkey. 
The other criticism about Fethullah Hoca is his authoritative attitude 
within the group. His understanding of democracy is based on leader's 
authority. Although he has a wide philosophical dimension, his community has 
no phifosophical and aesthetic dimension. 7 This is very much related to his 
6 Sabah. 29 January 1997. 
7 Hakan Yavuz, Milliyet, 3 August 1996. 
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elitist approach and his group's centricist structure. For Fethuıtah Gülen, the 
erisis people in the world experiencing today is the resurt of three things: first 
one is the incapacity of the leaders who rule in the world, second one is the 
management of economic rife by those who are not knowedgeable about 
economics, and third one is wastefuf expenditure. For this reason, Fethullah 
Hoca's solutionisa powerfulleader, an elite cadre consisting of people who 
are expert on economic life and a disciplined public who work hard and spend 
a little. 8 Ruşen Çakır argues that if Muslims cease to perceive democracy as 
a bogey man (man who frightens children), there wilf be demands for the 
innner-community democracy. 9 A group from the goveming elite in 
Süleymancıs chalfenged the unquestionable authority of Kemal Kaçar (leading 
figure of Sülevmancıs) and separated themselves to organize anather group. 
A similar exampre can be given from the Yeni Asya (one branch of Nurcus) 
group. The reading managers and joumalists in Yeni Asya group protested the 
autocratic attitudes of the owner and the leader of the group, Mehmet Kutlular. 
These are the signals of the search for democracy in the religious 
communities. At least, these events prove that the conventional performanca 
of the community begins to be questioned in the 1980s. Thus, we can claim 
that these efforts may have a commitment to civil society and democratization. 
8 Ahmet insel, "Altın Nesil, yeni Muhafazakarlık ve Fethuflah Gülen", Birikim, 
99 (July 1997), 69. 
9 Ruşen Çakır, " Türkiye Bağımsız Bir Politik Islamcı Harekete Hiç Tanık Oldu 
mu?", in islam ve Demokrasi. (istanbul: TÜSES Yayınları, 1994 ), 113. 
91 
· Yet, it was disappointing that there is an inner mechanism for supervision 
under Fethullah Hoca's personality in Fethullahcıs which does not seem to be 
challenged in anyway. 
Anather criticism about Fethullah Hoca is that although he is considered 
as a teader of a civil initiative, he has a tendeney to standardize the people; he 
tries to make people think and behave similarly. This is a dilemma that in fact 
Fethullah Hoca has an individualistic approach to Islam- in order to construct 
society, he thinks it is crucial to bring up individuals with high morals. 
However, the traditions which keep cultural continuity and civil mobilization 
alive in Fethullah Hoca's interpretation of Said-i Nursi, propose a homogenous 
society that reject differences. lndividual is not defıned with his identity, but he 
is defıned with his essence which means that in terms of needs and actions, 
he emphasizes a standard and atamistic understanding of individual; in terms 
of societal quality, he emphasizes solidarity. 10 Such an understanding may 
create a problem for the civil society attempt. Taday, in Turkey, the most 
crucial problem seems to be how to reconcile the differences in the public 
realm. At this point, Fethullah Hoca has no answer, except, tolerance. 11 
One can also eriticize Fethullah Hoca's being a democrat. Once, when 
he was in Erzurum, he heard that a film called "Birth of Islam" would be played 
in the cinema. He told the event in" Küçük Dünyam" as follows: " .... everybody 
10 Bayramoğlu, Yeniyüzyıl, 2 November 1996. 
11 "b"d ı ı . 
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had bought tickets for the film a week before. There were two cinemas in the 
city and they were the only places people went to enjoy. Most of the people 
wanted to go to that film because they thought seeing that film would be a 
pious act. When the day that the film would be shown came, ı told about it 
very dramatically in the mosque. Because a woman who seemed to be 
unrespectful to religion could not represent Hz.Aişe. ı turned to the community 
and said: K it was shame for you that they would make fun of your religion, your 
prophet and you would waste time by sitting here and listening to me ". Upon 
these words, the community stood up. 1 tried to calm them down, but they did 
not listen to me. They went to the cinema, destroyed it and beated the owner 
of the cinema". 12 When he was teliing the story, 1 expect him to be regretful 
about such a violent act. But he concluded his words by saying that " ... even 
Kanlı Fuat (a braggart in Erzurum) acted as a protector of the matter, 
supported the provocated masses. 13 lt is interesting that the same Fethullah 
Hoca, today, had the Writers' and Journalists' Foundation (He is its spiritual 
leader} sponsor a film called " Köpekler Adası". 14 ** 
12 Erdoğan, Küçük Dünyam, 75. 
13 ibid., 76. 
14 Milliyet, 26 October 1996. 
The film is about the effort of a journalist to observe the life of an old artist 
who lived in an isolated isiand with dogs and report it. 
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One should acccept that Fethullah Hoca has side-effects. Stili, ı think 
representing a civil initiative, a moderate approach, Fethullah Hoca differs 
from the other lslamists. In my opinion, Fethuffah Hoca's voice wiff have more 
inftuence on the side of the secularists whose canception of democracy has 
been exclusive vis-a-vis the lslamists. ı am hopeful about Fethullah Güfen's 
efforts because unlike the PP members, what Fethullah Hoca and his group in 
mind is a civil religion consisting of civic values and traditions; it is not a 
political reıigion aiming at establishing an lslamic state. By emphasizing 
tolerance, social harmony, Fethuflah Hoca may emerge as one of the effective 
proponents of cansensus politics and be an aıtemative solution to the erisis 
in cansolidation of democracy in Turkey. 
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